The ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES array in circuits/src/main.nr lines 55-66
is supposed to contain 10 UNIQUE treasure hashes, but index 8 and index 9
are identical:
Confirmed in test file circuits/src/tests.nr line 30:
Treasures[8] and Treasures[9] have identical secret values, meaning
the circuit only has 9 unique treasures despite being designed for 10.
Likelihood:
This is a deployment-time configuration error, present from launch
Any participant can generate a valid proof for the duplicate secret
Impact:
Only 9 unique treasures exist in the circuit instead of 10
100 ETH is allocated for 10 treasures but only 9 unique ones exist
One treasure secret can be used to claim twice, breaking hunt fairness
Hunt integrity is compromised — participants cannot trust the design
The duplicate is confirmed in two separate files:
ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES[8] and ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES[9] in main.nr are byte-for-byte identical
treasures[8] = 10 and treasures[9] = 10 in tests.nr confirm both use the same secret value
Both point to the same secret, creating only 9 unique treasures instead of 10.
A new unique 10th treasure secret must be generated and the duplicate
replaced. The circuit must then be recompiled to update the verifier.
Generate a new unique 10th treasure secret
Compute its Pedersen hash
Replace duplicate at line 65: ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES[9] = NEW_UNIQUE_HASH
Recompile: ./circuits/scripts/build.sh
Regenerate Verifier.sol
Verify all 10 hashes are now unique
The issue stems from a mismatch between the circuit and the contract’s economic assumptions: the Solidity contract is configured for `MAX_TREASURES = 10` and only allows the owner to call `withdraw()` once `claimsCount >= MAX_TREASURES`, while the Noir circuit’s baked-in `ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES` array does not actually contain ten distinct treasures because one hash is duplicated and another expected hash is missing. As a result, under the intended one-claim-per-treasure design described in the README, there are only nine uniquely claimable treasures even though the system is funded and accounted as if ten rewards can be legitimately redeemed. That creates two linked consequences from the same root cause: first, one treasure is effectively unclaimable because no valid proof can ever be generated for the missing allowed hash, and second, the normal “hunt over” withdrawal path becomes bricked because honest participants can never reach ten legitimate unique claims, leaving the post-hunt fund recovery logic via `withdraw` function permanently unreachable. The owner can still intervene through the emergency path.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.