DESIGN.md §4 and the flagOutcome natspec promise the moderator can "fix a typo'd outcome/attacker before any participant locks in the wrong distribution."
But claimAttackerBounty imposes no delay: the instant the moderator flags CORRUPTED, goodFaith=true, attacker=A, address A can claim min(bountyEntitlement, balance) (the whole pool) in the same or next block, which sets claimsStarted and forecloses the corrective re-flag. The single field whose mis-set value hands funds to an untrusted party is exactly the one with no correction latency.
Likelihood:
Occurs when the moderator flags good-faith CORRUPTED naming the wrong address (a typo, a stale value, or an address positioned to be named) while the registry is CORRUPTED.
The named address can claim before the moderator observes and re-flags, since there is no minimum delay.
Impact:
A single moderator naming error is irreversible: the wrongly-named address takes 100% of the pool (principal + bonus), with zero window to correct it, despite the advertised pre-claim correction window.
Run:
Result:
Give the good-faith bounty a short claim delay after the naming flag, so a mistyped attacker can be re-flagged before value moves:
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