Root + Impact

Description

whenPoolNotPaused gates both stake() and contributeBonus(), blocking new
inflows during an emergency pause. withdraw() has no such modifier, so
principal exits remain possible in any withdraw-allowed registry state even
while the pool is paused.

Risk

Likelihood:

• Only surfaces during an active pause combined with a withdraw-eligible
  registry state — a narrow, admin-triggered window, not attacker-chosen.

• Note: many protocols pause entries but deliberately leave exits open to
  avoid trapping user funds, so this asymmetry may be intentional rather than
  an oversight — worth confirming with the team.

Impact:

• If pause is meant to freeze all pool activity during an incident (e.g. a
  suspected accounting bug or malicious registry), stakers can still exit
  and change totalEligibleStake mid-incident, undermining the pause's
  purpose.

• No funds are stolen or misdirected — worst case is the pause control being
  less comprehensive than its sibling checks suggest.

Proof of Concept

This shows a paused pool still allowing a full withdrawal, since withdraw()
never checks the paused state that blocks stake() and contributeBonus().

Recommended Mitigation

Note: only apply if pause is intended to halt all pool activity. If exits
should remain open during pause by design, this is not a bug — worth a quick
confirmation before submitting.