sweepUnclaimedBonus() transfers bonus funds to recoveryAddress but does not set claimsStarted = true when totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0. Because of this, the moderator can still re-flag the pool from SURVIVED to good-faith CORRUPTED afterward.
If the re-flag happens before the sweep, the named attacker receives the full bounty including bonus.
If the sweep happens first, the bonus is already gone, so the attacker receives a reduced bounty (only stake amount if riskWindowStart == 0 and totalEligibleStake > 0 and 0 if totalEligibleStake == 0).
sweepUnclaimedBonus() can remove funds from the pool in these cases but does not set claimsStarted = true :
So moderator can still call flagOutcome() later and re-flag to good-faith CORRUPTED.
So malicious moderator can call flagOutcome() with SURVIVED amd then call sweepUnclaimedBonus() and later re-flag to good-faith CORRUPTED. Leads to reducing legitimate attacker bounty.
A legitimate good-faith attacker can lose bounty they would.
If riskWindowStart == 0 and totalEligibleStake > 0:
bonus is swept first
attacker later receives only the remaining stake amount
If totalEligibleStake == 0:
sweep removes everything
attacker later receives 0
If re-flag happens first:
Example: totalEligibleStake = 10,000, totalBonus = 5,000
Moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED before sweep.
Attacker bounty = 10,000 + 5,000 = 15,000
If sweep happens first:
Example: totalEligibleStake = 10,000, totalBonus = 5,000, riskWindowStart = 0
sweepUnclaimedBonus() sends 5,000 bonus to recoveryAddress first.
Then moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED.
Attacker bounty = 10,000 only
If total stake is already zero:
Example: totalEligibleStake = 0, totalBonus = 5,000
sweepUnclaimedBonus() sends all 5,000 to recoveryAddress.
Then moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED.
Attacker bounty = 0
Set claimsStarted = true when (totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0) is true:
This closes the re-flag window once bonus is swept.
Impact – Medium Up to the entire bonus pool can be routed to the wrong party for good, with no on-chain way to unwind it, and in a stakerless pool the effect is total since bountyEntitlement computes to zero and claimAttackerBounty reverts outright. This impact is definitely not High: the pool stays solvent throughout with no principal ever at risk, and the money ends up at the sponsor's own recoveryAddress, which in most pools means a sponsor recovering a bonus they funded themselves. The whitehat's claim on that bonus also only exists because the moderator changed their mind after the fact. Likelihood – Low Four separate things have to coincide: nobody touches the pool for the whole active-risk window (or there are no stakers to begin with), the moderator flags SURVIVED and later reverses to CORRUPTED, that reversal is good-faith with a named attacker, and a sweep lands between the two flags. The first cuts against staker self-interest, since skipping the poke costs them their entire bonus share, and the second asks the moderator to overturn a scope judgement, which is a bigger deal than the typo fix DESIGN.md #4 offers the window for. The sweep itself I'd treat as near-certain once the rest holds, given it's permissionless and the sponsor has an obvious reason to make the call, but assembling the first three in one pool lifecycle is where this stays rare.
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