FoundrySolidityLayer 2
7.25 ETH
Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

`sweepUnclaimedBonus()` Can Remove Bonus Before Good-Faith CORRUPTED Re-flag, Reducing Legitimate Attacker Bounty when `totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0`

Author Revealed upon completion

Summary

sweepUnclaimedBonus() transfers bonus funds to recoveryAddress but does not set claimsStarted = true when totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0. Because of this, the moderator can still re-flag the pool from SURVIVED to good-faith CORRUPTED afterward.

If the re-flag happens before the sweep, the named attacker receives the full bounty including bonus.
If the sweep happens first, the bonus is already gone, so the attacker receives a reduced bounty (only stake amount if riskWindowStart == 0 and totalEligibleStake > 0 and 0 if totalEligibleStake == 0).

Root Cause

sweepUnclaimedBonus() can remove funds from the pool in these cases but does not set claimsStarted = true :

if (totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0) {
totalBonus -= amount <= totalBonus ? amount : totalBonus;
}

So moderator can still call flagOutcome() later and re-flag to good-faith CORRUPTED.

Code Snippet-
https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2026-07-bc-confidence-pools/blob/58e8ba4ce3f3277866e4926f3140e597f9554a1e/src/ConfidencePool.sol#L499

So malicious moderator can call flagOutcome() with SURVIVED amd then call sweepUnclaimedBonus() and later re-flag to good-faith CORRUPTED. Leads to reducing legitimate attacker bounty.

Impact

A legitimate good-faith attacker can lose bounty they would.

  • If riskWindowStart == 0 and totalEligibleStake > 0:

    • bonus is swept first

    • attacker later receives only the remaining stake amount

  • If totalEligibleStake == 0:

    • sweep removes everything

    • attacker later receives 0

PoC

  1. If re-flag happens first:
    Example: totalEligibleStake = 10,000, totalBonus = 5,000
    Moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED before sweep.
    Attacker bounty = 10,000 + 5,000 = 15,000

  2. If sweep happens first:
    Example: totalEligibleStake = 10,000, totalBonus = 5,000, riskWindowStart = 0
    sweepUnclaimedBonus() sends 5,000 bonus to recoveryAddress first.
    Then moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED.
    Attacker bounty = 10,000 only

  3. If total stake is already zero:
    Example: totalEligibleStake = 0, totalBonus = 5,000
    sweepUnclaimedBonus() sends all 5,000 to recoveryAddress.
    Then moderator re-flags to good-faith CORRUPTED.
    Attacker bounty = 0

Mitigation

Set claimsStarted = true when (totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0) is true:

if (totalEligibleStake == 0 || riskWindowStart == 0) {
totalBonus -= amount <= totalBonus ? amount : totalBonus;
if (!claimsStarted) claimsStarted = true;
}

This closes the re-flag window once bonus is swept.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 2 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

sweepUnclaimedBonus() omits claimsStarted latch, letting a moderator re-flag re-snapshot a drained totalBonus and short the CORRUPTED bounty

Impact – Medium Up to the entire bonus pool can be routed to the wrong party for good, with no on-chain way to unwind it, and in a stakerless pool the effect is total since bountyEntitlement computes to zero and claimAttackerBounty reverts outright. This impact is definitely not High: the pool stays solvent throughout with no principal ever at risk, and the money ends up at the sponsor's own recoveryAddress, which in most pools means a sponsor recovering a bonus they funded themselves. The whitehat's claim on that bonus also only exists because the moderator changed their mind after the fact. Likelihood – Low Four separate things have to coincide: nobody touches the pool for the whole active-risk window (or there are no stakers to begin with), the moderator flags SURVIVED and later reverses to CORRUPTED, that reversal is good-faith with a named attacker, and a sweep lands between the two flags. The first cuts against staker self-interest, since skipping the poke costs them their entire bonus share, and the second asks the moderator to overturn a scope judgement, which is a bigger deal than the typo fix DESIGN.md #4 offers the window for. The sweep itself I'd treat as near-certain once the rest holds, given it's permissionless and the sponsor has an obvious reason to make the call, but assembling the first three in one pool lifecycle is where this stays rare.

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!