Algo Ssstablecoinsss
AI First Flight #2
Beginner FriendlyDeFi
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

revert

cat_man2

Algo Ssstablecoinsss - Findings Report

Table of contents

Contest Summary

Sponsor: First Flight #30

Dates: Dec 5th, 2024 - Dec 12th, 2024

See more contest details here

Results Summary

Number of findings:

  • High: 1

  • Medium: 1

  • Low: 0

High Risk Findings

H-01. In the function _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken constatnt variable MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR is only for WETH.

Submitted by eth0x.

Summary

The _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken function is responsible for ensuring that a user's health factor meets the minimum required standard. There is only implementation for WETH.

Vulnerability Details

In the function, there is only implementation for WETH.

@internal
def _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken(user: address):
user_health_factor: uint256 = self._health_factor(user)
assert (
user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR
), "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor"

Value of the MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR=10^18is higher than the Satoshi factor which is 10^8.

As a result, for WBTC, the user_health_factor can be inflated to more than 101010^{10} times its normal value.

Impact

Bigger value of MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR for WBTC allows on bigger value of user_health_factorand wrong value when

function should revert.

Tools Used

manual review

Recommendations

Add MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR also for WBTC.

@internal
def _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken(user: address):
user_health_factor: uint256 = self._health_factor(user)
# Check if the user's token is WBTC and adjust health factor accordingly
if user_health_factor >= (MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR * 10**10):
# If user health factor is higher due to WBTC precision, still ensure it meets the minimum
assert user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR, "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor"
else:
assert user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR, "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor"
​

Medium Risk Findings

M-01. The TIMEOUT is set as a fixed constant of 72 hours, which makes it inflexible in adapting to the market price.

Submitted by hyer.

Summary

In this contract, the TIMEOUT is set as a fixed constant (72 hours, or 259200 seconds). This means that if the oracle price data is not updated within 72 hours, the data will be considered outdated, and the contract will trigger a revert.

Vulnerability Details

At this location in the code,
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-12-algo-ssstablecoinsss/blob/4cc3197b13f1db728fd6509cc1dcbfd7a2360179/src/oracle_lib.vy#L15

TIMEOUT: constant(uint256) = 72 * 3600

the timeout is directly set to 72 hours. For an oracle, which cannot dynamically adjust the price updates, this is a suboptimal approach.

Impact

  • Fixed Timeout: The TIMEOUT is hardcoded to 72 hours. In markets with frequent fluctuations or assets that require more frequent price updates, 72 hours might be too long. Conversely, if the timeout is too short, it could cause frequent errors due to the inability to update data in time, disrupting normal contract operations.

  • Non-adjustable Timeout: If the contract's requirements change (e.g., market conditions evolve or the protocol requires more flexibility), the fixed TIMEOUT cannot be dynamically adjusted, leading to potential mismatches with current needs.

  • Lack of Flexibility: The current timeout mechanism is static and cannot be adjusted based on market volatility or the frequency of oracle updates. In volatile markets, a shorter TIMEOUT might be necessary, while in stable markets, a longer timeout would be more appropriate.
    ##Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Introduce a dynamic price expiration mechanism that adjusts based on market conditions. Use volatility data (such as standard deviation or market price fluctuation) to dynamically adjust the timeout period. This can be achieved by monitoring market volatility and adjusting the TIMEOUT accordingly:

# Monitor market volatility and dynamically adjust TIMEOUT
@external
def adjustTimeoutBasedOnVolatility(volatility: uint256):
if volatility > HIGH_VOLATILITY_THRESHOLD:
self.TIMEOUT = SHORTER_TIMEOUT # In high volatility, decrease TIMEOUT
else:
self.TIMEOUT = LONGER_TIMEOUT # In stable market, increase TIMEOUT
log TimeoutAdjusted(self.TIMEOUT)
​

Low Risk Findings

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] In the function \_revert_if_health_factor_is_broken constatnt variable MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR is only for WETH.

## Description The `_revert_if_health_factor_is_broken` function is responsible for ensuring that a user's health factor meets the minimum required standard. There is only implementation for WETH. ## Vulnerability Details In the function, there is only implementation for WETH. ```Solidity @internal def _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken(user: address): user_health_factor: uint256 = self._health_factor(user) assert ( user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR ), "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor" ``` Value of the `MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR=10^18`is higher than the Satoshi factor which is 10^8. As a result, for WBTC, the `user_health_factor` can be inflated to more than 101010^{10} times its normal value. ## Impact Bigger value of MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR for WBTC allows on bigger value of `user_health_factor`and wrong value when function should revert. ## Recommendations Add MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR also for WBTC. ```Solidity @internal def _revert_if_health_factor_is_broken(user: address): user_health_factor: uint256 = self._health_factor(user) # Check if the user's token is WBTC and adjust health factor accordingly if user_health_factor >= (MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR * 10**10): # If user health factor is higher due to WBTC precision, still ensure it meets the minimum assert user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR, "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor" else: assert user_health_factor >= MIN_HEALTH_FACTOR, "DSCEngine__BreaksHealthFactor" ```

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