Normal behavior:
When a user calls likeUser and sends ETH, the payment should be attributed to that user so that, upon a mutual match, both users’ contributed funds (minus protocol fees) are pooled and transferred to a newly deployed multisig wallet.
Issue:
likeUser accepts ETH but never credits msg.value to userBalances[msg.sender].
As a result, all user payments are silently accumulated in the contract balance without being associated with any user, making them unusable for matches.
When a match occurs, rewards are calculated exclusively from userBalances, which are always zero.
Likelihood:
Reason 1: Any call to likeUser with ETH triggers this behavior.
Reason 2: No special permissions or edge conditions are required.
Impact:
Impact 1: Permanent loss of user funds: ETH sent during likeUser is never recoverable by users.
Impact 2: Broken core functionality: matched users receive 0 ETH in their multisig wallet, defeating the main purpose of the protocol.
Impact 3: Protocol trust failure: users pay but receive no economic outcome, even on successful matches.
Explanation
Because msg.value is not recorded, the accounting system is permanently out of sync with the actual ETH balance of the contract.
The stuck ETH cannot be withdrawn by users and is not assigned to fees.
Credit incoming ETH to the sender’s balance when liking a profile.
Optionally, add a user withdrawal or refund mechanism for unmatched likes to further protect users.
## Description User A calls `likeUser` and sends `value > 1` ETH. According to the design of DatingDapp, the amount for user A should be accumulated by `userBalances`. Otherwise, in the subsequent calculations, the balance for each user will be 0. ## Vulnerability Details When User A calls `likeUser`, the accumulation of `userBalances` is not performed. ```solidity function likeUser( address liked ) external payable { require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "Must send at least 1 ETH"); require(!likes[msg.sender][liked], "Already liked"); require(msg.sender != liked, "Cannot like yourself"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(msg.sender) != 0, "Must have a profile NFT"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(liked) != 0, "Liked user must have a profile NFT"); likes[msg.sender][liked] = true; emit Liked(msg.sender, liked); // Check if mutual like if (likes[liked][msg.sender]) { matches[msg.sender].push(liked); matches[liked].push(msg.sender); emit Matched(msg.sender, liked); matchRewards(liked, msg.sender); } } ``` This will result in `totalRewards` always being 0, affecting all subsequent calculations: ```solidity uint256 totalRewards = matchUserOne + matchUserTwo; uint256 matchingFees = (totalRewards * FIXEDFEE ) / 100; uint256 rewards = totalRewards - matchingFees; totalFees += matchingFees; ``` ## POC ```solidity function testUserBalanceshouldIncreaseAfterLike() public { vm.prank(user1); likeRegistry.likeUser{value: 20 ether}(user2); assertEq(likeRegistry.userBalances(user1), 20 ether, "User1 balance should be 20 ether"); } ``` Then we will get an error: ```shell [FAIL: User1 balance should be 20 ether: 0 != 20000000000000000000] ``` ## Impact - Users will be unable to receive rewards. - The contract owner will also be unable to withdraw ETH from the contract. ## Recommendations Add processing for `userBalances` in the `likeUser` function: ```diff function likeUser( address liked ) external payable { require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "Must send at least 1 ETH"); require(!likes[msg.sender][liked], "Already liked"); require(msg.sender != liked, "Cannot like yourself"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(msg.sender) != 0, "Must have a profile NFT"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(liked) != 0, "Liked user must have a profile NFT"); likes[msg.sender][liked] = true; + userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value; emit Liked(msg.sender, liked); [...] } ```
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