likeUser() requires at least 1 ETH per like. The ETH is sent to LikeRegistry and the likes mapping is set. If the liked user never reciprocates, the ETH is permanently locked in the contract with no way to withdraw.
The contract has no unlike() function, no refund() function, and no timeout after which a liker can reclaim their ETH. userBalances is never credited (H-01), so there is no balance to claim even if a withdrawal path existed. The only ETH exit is withdrawFees() (owner only) and the MultiSig transfer in matchRewards.
Likelihood:
Any user who likes someone and never receives a mutual like permanently loses their ETH. This is the default outcome for most likes on any dating platform.
Impact:
All ETH sent via likeUser for non-matching pairs is permanently locked in LikeRegistry. The owner can only withdraw totalFees, which are 10% of matchRewards — not the locked like ETH. Every unreciprocated 1+ ETH like is a permanent loss to the sender.
Alice likes Bob and sends 1 ETH. Bob never reciprocates. The test verifies that LikeRegistry holds Alice's ETH indefinitely. The commented-out lines show that no unlike or refund function exists to call — the contract simply has no exit path for this ETH.
Alice's 1 ETH sits in LikeRegistry indefinitely with no recovery path.
Track each liker's outstanding balance and provide a withdrawal function callable after a timeout:
## Description User A calls `likeUser` and sends `value > 1` ETH. According to the design of DatingDapp, the amount for user A should be accumulated by `userBalances`. Otherwise, in the subsequent calculations, the balance for each user will be 0. ## Vulnerability Details When User A calls `likeUser`, the accumulation of `userBalances` is not performed. ```solidity function likeUser( address liked ) external payable { require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "Must send at least 1 ETH"); require(!likes[msg.sender][liked], "Already liked"); require(msg.sender != liked, "Cannot like yourself"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(msg.sender) != 0, "Must have a profile NFT"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(liked) != 0, "Liked user must have a profile NFT"); likes[msg.sender][liked] = true; emit Liked(msg.sender, liked); // Check if mutual like if (likes[liked][msg.sender]) { matches[msg.sender].push(liked); matches[liked].push(msg.sender); emit Matched(msg.sender, liked); matchRewards(liked, msg.sender); } } ``` This will result in `totalRewards` always being 0, affecting all subsequent calculations: ```solidity uint256 totalRewards = matchUserOne + matchUserTwo; uint256 matchingFees = (totalRewards * FIXEDFEE ) / 100; uint256 rewards = totalRewards - matchingFees; totalFees += matchingFees; ``` ## POC ```solidity function testUserBalanceshouldIncreaseAfterLike() public { vm.prank(user1); likeRegistry.likeUser{value: 20 ether}(user2); assertEq(likeRegistry.userBalances(user1), 20 ether, "User1 balance should be 20 ether"); } ``` Then we will get an error: ```shell [FAIL: User1 balance should be 20 ether: 0 != 20000000000000000000] ``` ## Impact - Users will be unable to receive rewards. - The contract owner will also be unable to withdraw ETH from the contract. ## Recommendations Add processing for `userBalances` in the `likeUser` function: ```diff function likeUser( address liked ) external payable { require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "Must send at least 1 ETH"); require(!likes[msg.sender][liked], "Already liked"); require(msg.sender != liked, "Cannot like yourself"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(msg.sender) != 0, "Must have a profile NFT"); require(profileNFT.profileToToken(liked) != 0, "Liked user must have a profile NFT"); likes[msg.sender][liked] = true; + userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value; emit Liked(msg.sender, liked); [...] } ```
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