DatingDapp

AI First Flight #6
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Blocked user can remint profile

Root + Impact

Description

The app owner can call blockProfile() to remove a user's dating profile NFT. The function burns the user's current NFT and deletes the profileToToken entry.

Because the contract does not store a separate blocklist, the blocked address can immediately call mintProfile() again. The minting guard only checks whether profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, and blocking resets that value to zero.

function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external {
// @> A blocked user passes this check after blockProfile deletes profileToToken
require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists");
uint256 tokenId = ++_nextTokenId;
_safeMint(msg.sender, tokenId);
_profiles[tokenId] = Profile(name, age, profileImage);
profileToToken[msg.sender] = tokenId;
emit ProfileMinted(msg.sender, tokenId, name, age, profileImage);
}
function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner {
uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress];
require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found");
_burn(tokenId);
// @> This resets the only state used by mintProfile to determine eligibility
delete profileToToken[blockAddress];
delete _profiles[tokenId];
emit ProfileBurned(blockAddress, tokenId);
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This occurs whenever a blocked user calls mintProfile() again after being blocked.

  • The action requires no special permission because profile minting is open to any address with no active profile.

Impact:

  • App owner moderation can be bypassed by re-creating the profile.

  • A blocked user can regain access to profile-gated app actions such as liking users.

Proof of Concept

function testBlockedUserCanMintAgain() public {
SoulboundProfileNFT nft = new SoulboundProfileNFT();
address alice = address(0xA11CE);
vm.prank(alice);
nft.mintProfile("Alice", 25, "ipfs://alice");
assertEq(nft.profileToToken(alice), 1);
nft.blockProfile(alice);
assertEq(nft.profileToToken(alice), 0);
vm.prank(alice);
nft.mintProfile("Alice again", 25, "ipfs://new-alice");
assertEq(nft.profileToToken(alice), 2);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Track blocked addresses separately and prevent them from minting a new profile.

contract SoulboundProfileNFT is ERC721, Ownable {
+ mapping(address => bool) public blocked;
function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external {
+ require(!blocked[msg.sender], "Profile blocked");
require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists");
uint256 tokenId = ++_nextTokenId;
_safeMint(msg.sender, tokenId);
function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner {
uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress];
require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found");
+ blocked[blockAddress] = true;
_burn(tokenId);
delete profileToToken[blockAddress];
delete _profiles[tokenId];

If the intended behavior is temporary removal instead of a permanent ban, add a separate unblock function controlled by the app owner.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` make it possible to recreate the profile

## Description The `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` function uses `delete profileToToken[blockAddress]`, which resets `profileToToken[blockAddress]` to `0`. Since the mintProfile function checks for an existing profile by verifying that `profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0`, a blocked account can be recreated by simply minting a new profile. This behavior bypasses the intended permanent block functionality. ## Vulnerability Details By deleting the mapping entry for a blocked account, the contract inadvertently allows a new mintProfile call to pass the check `require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists")`. Essentially, once an account is blocked, its associated mapping entry is cleared, so the condition to identify an account with an existing profile is no longer met. This loophole enables a blocked account to recreate its profile, undermining the purpose of blocking. ## Impact A blocked account, which should be permanently barred from engaging with the platform, can circumvent this restriction by re-minting its profile. The integrity of the platform is compromised, as blocked users could regain access and potentially perform further malicious actions. ## POC ```solidity function testRecereationOfBlockedAccount() public { // Alice mints a profile successfully vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); // Owner blocks Alice's account, which deletes Alice profile mapping vm.prank(owner); soulboundNFT.blockProfile(user); // The blocked user (Alice) attempts to mint a new profile. // Due to the reset mapping value (0), the require check is bypassed. vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); } ``` ## Recommendations - When blocking an account, implement a mechanism to permanently mark that address as blocked rather than simply deleting an entry. For example, maintain a separate mapping (e.g., isBlocked) to record blocked accounts, and update mintProfile to check if an account is permanently barred from minting: Example modification: ```diff + mapping(address => bool) public isBlocked; ... function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external { + require(!isBlocked[msg.sender], "Account is permanently blocked"); require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists"); uint256 tokenId = ++_nextTokenId; _safeMint(msg.sender, tokenId); // Store metadata on-chain _profiles[tokenId] = Profile(name, age, profileImage); profileToToken[msg.sender] = tokenId; emit ProfileMinted(msg.sender, tokenId, name, age, profileImage); } ... function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner { uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress]; require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found"); _burn(tokenId); delete profileToToken[blockAddress]; delete _profiles[tokenId]; + isBlocked[blockAddress] = true; emit ProfileBurned(blockAddress, tokenId); } ```

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