DatingDapp

AI First Flight #6
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

`SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` is bypassable: a blocked user can call `mintProfile` again and recreate their profile

Description


blockProfileis meant to let the app owner ban a user, but it only burns the user's current NFT and clears profileToToken[blockAddress]— it keeps no record that the address is blocked:


function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner {
uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress];
require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found");
_burn(tokenId);
delete profileToToken[blockAddress]; // @> resets the user back to the "no profile" state
delete _profiles[tokenId];
emit ProfileBurned(blockAddress, tokenId);
}
```
​
`mintProfile` only checks `profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0`. After being blocked, the user's `profileToToken` is `0` again, so the **blocked user can simply call `mintProfile` once more and recreate their profile**, fully bypassing the block.
​
```solidity
function mintProfile(...) external {
require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists"); // @> passes again after a block
...
}
```
​
## Risk
​
**Likelihood: High**
​
- Any blocked user can immediately re-mint; it requires a single transaction and no special conditions.
​
**Impact: Medium**
​
- The blocking / moderation feature is ineffective: a banned or malicious user re-creates their profile at will, defeating the owner's ability to remove bad actors. The intended access-control guarantee of `blockProfile` does not hold.
​
## Proof of Concept
​
```solidity
// owner.blockProfile(mallory) -> mallory's NFT burned, profileToToken[mallory] = 0
// mallory.mintProfile("...", ...) -> passes require(profileToToken[mallory] == 0) -> new profile minted
// => mallory is back in the app; the block achieved nothing.
```
​
## Recommended Mitigation
​
Persist a blocklist and enforce it in `mintProfile` (and `likeUser`):
​
```solidity
mapping(address => bool) public blocked;
function blockProfile(address a) external onlyOwner { ...; blocked[a] = true; }
function mintProfile(...) external { require(!blocked[msg.sender], "blocked"); require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, ...); ... }
```
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 7 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` make it possible to recreate the profile

## Description The `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` function uses `delete profileToToken[blockAddress]`, which resets `profileToToken[blockAddress]` to `0`. Since the mintProfile function checks for an existing profile by verifying that `profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0`, a blocked account can be recreated by simply minting a new profile. This behavior bypasses the intended permanent block functionality. ## Vulnerability Details By deleting the mapping entry for a blocked account, the contract inadvertently allows a new mintProfile call to pass the check `require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists")`. Essentially, once an account is blocked, its associated mapping entry is cleared, so the condition to identify an account with an existing profile is no longer met. This loophole enables a blocked account to recreate its profile, undermining the purpose of blocking. ## Impact A blocked account, which should be permanently barred from engaging with the platform, can circumvent this restriction by re-minting its profile. The integrity of the platform is compromised, as blocked users could regain access and potentially perform further malicious actions. ## POC ```solidity function testRecereationOfBlockedAccount() public { // Alice mints a profile successfully vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); // Owner blocks Alice's account, which deletes Alice profile mapping vm.prank(owner); soulboundNFT.blockProfile(user); // The blocked user (Alice) attempts to mint a new profile. // Due to the reset mapping value (0), the require check is bypassed. vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); } ``` ## Recommendations - When blocking an account, implement a mechanism to permanently mark that address as blocked rather than simply deleting an entry. For example, maintain a separate mapping (e.g., isBlocked) to record blocked accounts, and update mintProfile to check if an account is permanently barred from minting: Example modification: ```diff + mapping(address => bool) public isBlocked; ... function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external { + require(!isBlocked[msg.sender], "Account is permanently blocked"); require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists"); uint256 tokenId = ++_nextTokenId; _safeMint(msg.sender, tokenId); // Store metadata on-chain _profiles[tokenId] = Profile(name, age, profileImage); profileToToken[msg.sender] = tokenId; emit ProfileMinted(msg.sender, tokenId, name, age, profileImage); } ... function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner { uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress]; require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found"); _burn(tokenId); delete profileToToken[blockAddress]; delete _profiles[tokenId]; + isBlocked[blockAddress] = true; emit ProfileBurned(blockAddress, tokenId); } ```

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