DatingDapp

AI First Flight #6
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

blockProfile deletes profileToToken, so a blocked user can immediately mint a new profile

Root + Impact

Description

  • blockProfile lets the app owner remove a user from the app (e.g. scammers or abusive users).

  • It burns the token and deletes profileToToken[blockAddress]. mintProfile only checks profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, so the blocked address can immediately mint a new profile and use the app again (like, match, receive pooled ETH). There is no record that the address was blocked.

function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner {
...
_burn(tokenId);
@> delete profileToToken[blockAddress]; // resets the only check used by mintProfile
delete _profiles[tokenId];
}
​
function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external {
@> require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists");
...
}

Path:

  1. The owner blocks Bob for abuse.

  2. Bob calls mintProfile again in the next block with a new name/photo.

  3. Bob is back in the app and can like/match users and receive funds; the moderation action had no effect.

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Any blocked user can do this at any time, with one transaction.

Impact:

  • The moderation feature does not work; blocked (possibly malicious) users keep interacting with others and receiving funds, which defeats the purpose of the owner's blocking power.

Proof of Concept

Test setup: owner deploys SoulboundProfileNFT and LikeRegistry(address(nft)); alice, bob, carol each get 10 ETH and mint a profile (token ids 1, 2, 3). Full file test/AuditPoC.t.sol, forge test --mc AuditPoC passes.

function test_F3_blockedUserCanRemint() public {
vm.prank(owner);
nft.blockProfile(bob);
assertEq(nft.profileToToken(bob), 0);
vm.prank(bob);
nft.mintProfile("bob again", 30, "ipfs://b");
assertGt(nft.profileToToken(bob), 0);
vm.prank(bob);
reg.likeUser{value: 1 ether}(alice); // fully back in the app
}

Recommended Mitigation

Record blocked addresses and check them on mint (and in likeUser):

+ mapping(address => bool) public isBlocked;
function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner {
...
+ isBlocked[blockAddress] = true;
}
function mintProfile(...) external {
+ require(!isBlocked[msg.sender], "Blocked");
require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists");
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 8 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` make it possible to recreate the profile

## Description The `SoulboundProfileNFT::blockProfile` function uses `delete profileToToken[blockAddress]`, which resets `profileToToken[blockAddress]` to `0`. Since the mintProfile function checks for an existing profile by verifying that `profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0`, a blocked account can be recreated by simply minting a new profile. This behavior bypasses the intended permanent block functionality. ## Vulnerability Details By deleting the mapping entry for a blocked account, the contract inadvertently allows a new mintProfile call to pass the check `require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists")`. Essentially, once an account is blocked, its associated mapping entry is cleared, so the condition to identify an account with an existing profile is no longer met. This loophole enables a blocked account to recreate its profile, undermining the purpose of blocking. ## Impact A blocked account, which should be permanently barred from engaging with the platform, can circumvent this restriction by re-minting its profile. The integrity of the platform is compromised, as blocked users could regain access and potentially perform further malicious actions. ## POC ```solidity function testRecereationOfBlockedAccount() public { // Alice mints a profile successfully vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); // Owner blocks Alice's account, which deletes Alice profile mapping vm.prank(owner); soulboundNFT.blockProfile(user); // The blocked user (Alice) attempts to mint a new profile. // Due to the reset mapping value (0), the require check is bypassed. vm.prank(user); soulboundNFT.mintProfile("Alice", 18, "ipfs://profileImageAlice"); } ``` ## Recommendations - When blocking an account, implement a mechanism to permanently mark that address as blocked rather than simply deleting an entry. For example, maintain a separate mapping (e.g., isBlocked) to record blocked accounts, and update mintProfile to check if an account is permanently barred from minting: Example modification: ```diff + mapping(address => bool) public isBlocked; ... function mintProfile(string memory name, uint8 age, string memory profileImage) external { + require(!isBlocked[msg.sender], "Account is permanently blocked"); require(profileToToken[msg.sender] == 0, "Profile already exists"); uint256 tokenId = ++_nextTokenId; _safeMint(msg.sender, tokenId); // Store metadata on-chain _profiles[tokenId] = Profile(name, age, profileImage); profileToToken[msg.sender] = tokenId; emit ProfileMinted(msg.sender, tokenId, name, age, profileImage); } ... function blockProfile(address blockAddress) external onlyOwner { uint256 tokenId = profileToToken[blockAddress]; require(tokenId != 0, "No profile found"); _burn(tokenId); delete profileToToken[blockAddress]; delete _profiles[tokenId]; + isBlocked[blockAddress] = true; emit ProfileBurned(blockAddress, tokenId); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!