MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

When no players claim, 90% of the reward pool is permanently stuck

Title: When no players claim, 90% of the reward pool is permanently stuck

Severity: Medium

Scope Affected:

  • src/Pot.sol

  • Pot.closePot()

Root + Impact

Description

The normal behavior is that, after the 90-day claim period, the manager takes a 10% cut of the remaining pool and the rest is distributed equally to those who claimed in time.

The issue is that closePot() does not handle the case where no players claimed in time. It calculates claimantCut, but then loops over an empty claimants array. Only the manager cut is transferred, while the remaining 90% stays in the pot forever.

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
@> _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • This occurs whenever a contest reaches the end of the claim period with zero successful claimants.

  • This occurs during normal closure because closePot() does not branch on claimants.length == 0.

Impact:

  • 90% of the reward pool remains locked in the pot.

  • Neither players nor the manager have a recovery path for the stuck tokens.

Proof of Concept

function testNoClaimantsLeavesNinetyPercentStuck() public {
address[] memory players = new address[](2);
players[0] = player1;
players[1] = player2;
uint256[] memory rewards = new uint256[](2);
rewards[0] = 500 ether;
rewards[1] = 500 ether;
vm.startPrank(admin);
address contest = manager.createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(token), 1_000 ether);
manager.fundContest(0);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days);
manager.closeContest(contest);
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(token.balanceOf(address(manager)), 100 ether);
assertEq(token.balanceOf(contest), 900 ether);
}

Only the 10% manager cut is transferred. The remaining 900 ether is stuck in the pot.

Recommended Mitigation

Handle zero claimants explicitly:

if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(manager, managerCut);
+ if (claimants.length == 0) {
+ i_token.transfer(manager, remainingRewards - managerCut);
+ remainingRewards = 0;
+ return;
+ }
- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
...
}

The exact recipient of the no-claimant remainder should be defined by protocol requirements.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 6 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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