MyCut

AI First Flight #8
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

nteger division precision loss in closePot() leads to leftover funds remaining in contract

Root + Impact

Description

  • The protocol distributes remaining rewards between the manager and claimants when closePot() is called.

  • However, both calculations use integer division without handling remainders, causing precision loss and leaving undistributed funds in the contract.

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
// @> Precision loss: division truncates remainder
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
// @> Further precision loss from second division
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Integer division is always used during closePot() execution.

  • Any scenario where values are not perfectly divisible will trigger precision loss.

Impact:

  • A portion of remainingRewards becomes permanently undistributed.

  • Funds can remain stuck in the contract after pot closure due to truncation errors.


Proof of Concept

Example:

remainingRewards = 8 ether
managerCutPercent = 10
i_players.length = 3

Execution:

managerCut = 8 / 10 = 0.8 ether → truncated to 0 ether
remaining after manager = 8 ether
claimantCut = 8 / 3 = 2.666... ether → truncated to 2 ether
distributed to claimants = 2 * 3 = 6 ether

Final state

Total distributed:
= 0 (manager)
+ 6 ether (users)
= 6 ether
Remaining stuck:
= 2 ether

Recommended Mitigation

Handle remainder explicitly to ensure full distribution.

uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
uint256 remainderAfterManager = remainingRewards - managerCut;
uint256 claimantCut = remainderAfterManager / i_players.length;
+ uint256 distributedToClaimants = claimantCut * i_players.length;
+ uint256 leftover = remainderAfterManager - distributedToClaimants;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
+ // send leftover to owner or last claimant
+ if (leftover > 0) {
+ i_token.transfer(msg.sender, leftover);
+ }

This ensures:

Total distributed == remainingRewards

and prevents accumulation of stuck funds due to rounding.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 15 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-03] [H-03] Precision loss can lead to rewards getting stuck in the pot forever

### \[H-03] Precision loss can lead to rewards getting stuck in the pot forever **Description:** When contest manager closes the pot by calling `Pot::closePot`, 10 percent of the remaining rewards are transferred to the contest manager and the rest are distributed equally among the claimants. It does this by dividing the rewards by the manager's cut percentage which is 10. Then the remaining rewards are divided by the number of players to distribute equally among claimants. Since solidity allows only integer division this will lead to precision loss which will cause a portion of funds to be left in the pot forever. Each pot follows the same method, so as number of pots grow, the loss of funds is very significant. **Impact:** Reward tokens get stuck in the pot forever which causes loss of funds. **Proof of code:** Add the below test to `test/TestMyCut.t.sol` ```javascript function testPrecisionLoss() public mintAndApproveTokens { ContestManager cm = ContestManager(conMan); uint playersLength = 3; address[] memory p = new address[](playersLength); uint256[] memory r = new uint256[](playersLength); uint tr = 86; p[0] = makeAddr("_player1"); p[1] = makeAddr("_player2"); p[2] = makeAddr("_player3"); r[0] = 20; r[1] = 23; r[2] = 43; vm.startPrank(user); address pot = cm.createContest(p, r, weth, tr); cm.fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("\n\ntoken balance in pot before: ", weth.balanceOf(pot)); vm.prank(p[1]); // player 2 Pot(pot).claimCut(); vm.prank(p[0]); // player 1 Pot(pot).claimCut(); vm.prank(user); vm.warp(block.timestamp + 90 days + 1); cm.closeContest(pot); console.log( "\n\ntoken balance in pot after closing pot: ", weth.balanceOf(pot) ); assert(weth.balanceOf(pot) != 0); } ``` Run the below test command in terminal ```Solidity forge test --mt testPrecisionLoss -vv ``` Which results in the below output ```Solidity [⠒] Compiling... [⠆] Compiling 1 files with 0.8.20 [⠰] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 2.57s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testPrecisionLoss() (gas: 936926) Logs: token balance in pot before: 86 token balance in pot after closing pot: 1 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.75ms (654.60µs CPU time) Ran 1 test suite in 261.16ms (1.75ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests) ``` If you observe the output you can see the pot still has rewards despite distributing them to claimants. **Recommended Mitigations:** Fixed-Point Arithmetic: Utilize a fixed-point arithmetic library or implement a custom solution to handle fee calculations with greater precision.

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