MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Zero number of claimants leads to loss of funds

Description

  • When the 90‑day window ends, the contract should take the manager’s cut and then distribute the entire remainder among eligible claimants (or have a deterministic policy for when there are no claimants), ensuring no funds remain stranded.

  • If no one claims before closure, closePot() pays only the manager cut and does not handle the remainder. Because it iterates over claimants (length = 0) and never updates remainingRewards, ~90% of the pot stays locked in the Pot contract, with no mechanism to withdraw it.

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
// @> Sends 10% to msg.sender (ContestManager in practice)
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
// @> claimantCut derived from players, not claimants, AND
// @> loop does nothing when no one claimed.
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
// @> remainingRewards is NOT decremented; remainder stays in contract,
// @> and there is no sweep/withdraw function in Pot.
}
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

  • Contests often have low participation or edge cases where no claims occur within 90 days; in such runs, this path executes as part of routine operations.

  • The code path is triggered every time the manager closes a pot with zero claimants and a positive remainingRewards.

Impact: Medium

  • Funds stranded in Pot: The majority of rewards (~90%) remain locked with no claim route or withdrawal API, violating distribution guarantees.

  • Accounting inconsistency: getRemainingRewards() continues to report the original value, enabling future confusion and breaking financial reconciliation.

Proof of Concept

  • Copy the code below to TestMyCut.t.sol.

  • Run command forge test --mt testFundLockedWhenZeroClaimants -vv.

function testFundLockedWhenZeroClaimants() public mintAndApproveTokens {
// Create and fund the contest
vm.startPrank(user);
contest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), 20);
ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0);
// Fast-forward >90 days
vm.warp(91 days);
// Close the contest without any claimants
// Ownner receive only manager cut, rest remains locked in the Pot
ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(contest);
vm.stopPrank();
// Check balances
uint256 contestManagerBalance = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(conMan);
emit log_named_uint("Contest Manager balance after closing contest with zero claimants", contestManagerBalance);
uint256 contestBalance = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(contest);
emit log_named_uint("Contest balance after closing contest with zero claimants", contestBalance);
}

Output:

[⠊] Compiling...
No files changed, compilation skipped
Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut
[PASS] testFundLockedWhenZeroClaimants() (gas: 1076097)
Logs:
User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D
Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353
Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D
Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353
Contest Manager balance after closing contest with zero claimants: 2
Contest balance after closing contest with zero claimants: 18
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.01ms (701.90µs CPU time)
Ran 1 test suite in 13.19ms (3.01ms CPU time): 1 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 skipped (1 total tests)

Recommended Mitigation

  • Define explicit behavior for zero-claimant closure and fix accounting:

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
- _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
- }
+ uint256 distributable = remainingRewards - managerCut;
+ uint256 nClaimants = claimants.length;
+ if (nClaimants == 0) {
+ // No claimants: deterministically route the remainder.
+ // Option A: send all remaining to manager/treasury.
+ i_token.transfer(msg.sender, distributable);
+ remainingRewards = 0;
+ closed = true;
+ return;
+ }
+ // Otherwise, split among actual claimants (fix denominator elsewhere).
+ uint256 claimantCut = distributable / nClaimants;
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < nClaimants; i++) {
+ _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
+ }
+ // Update accounting and handle dust
+ uint256 paid = claimantCut * nClaimants;
+ uint256 leftover = distributable - paid;
+ if (leftover > 0) {
+ i_token.transfer(msg.sender, leftover); // or reserve
+ }
+ remainingRewards -= (managerCut + paid + leftover);
+ closed = true;
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 6 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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