MyCut

AI First Flight #8
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Pot::closePot` divides the remaining rewards by `i_players.length` instead of `claimants.length`, underpaying claimants and stranding funds in the Pot

Root + Impact

Description

  • After the 90-day claim period, closePot should give the manager 10% of the remaining rewards and split the rest equally among the players who claimed.

  • claimantCut is divided by the total number of players (i_players.length), but it is only paid to claimants. Every player who didn't claim still counts in the divisor, so their share is never sent to anyone and stays in the Pot, which has no function to withdraw it.

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Whenever at least one player doesn't claim within 90 days, which is exactly the situation closePot exists for.

  • It happens on every normal close; no attacker or special setup is needed.

Impact:

  • Claimants receive only claimants.length / i_players.length of the redistribution they are owed.

  • The rest stays in the Pot with no function to withdraw it. In the PoC, 202.5 of 400 tokens (~51% of the pot) are stranded.

Proof of Concept

4 players with 100 tokens each; only player1 claims. Spec payout for player1 is 100 + (300 − 30) = 370, and the Pot should end empty. In reality player1 gets 167.5 and 202.5 is left in the Pot.

function testWrongDivisorStrandsFunds() public mintAndApproveTokens {
address player3 = makeAddr("player3");
address player4 = makeAddr("player4");
address[] memory ps = new address[](4);
ps[0] = player1; ps[1] = player2; ps[2] = player3; ps[3] = player4;
uint256[] memory rs = new uint256[](4);
for (uint256 i; i < 4; i++) rs[i] = 100e18;
vm.startPrank(user);
address pot = ContestManager(conMan).createContest(ps, rs, IERC20(address(weth)), 400e18);
ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.prank(player1);
Pot(pot).claimCut();
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days);
vm.prank(user);
ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(pot);
// Spec: player1 = 100 + (300 - 30) = 370, pot = 0
// Actual: claimantCut = 270 / 4 = 67.5
assertEq(weth.balanceOf(player1), 167.5e18);
assertEq(weth.balanceOf(pot), 202.5e18);
}

Recommended Mitigation

- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
- _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
- }
+ if (claimants.length > 0) {
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
+ _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
+ }
+ }
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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