MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Permanent Fund Loss in `closePot()` Due to Incorrect Divisor

Description

When closePot() is called after the 90-day lockup, it redistributes unclaimed rewards to the players who claimed (the claimants array). The per-claimant share is calculated by dividing the available pool by i_players.length (the total number of players in the contest).

However, the loop only iterates over claimants (players who actually called claimCut()). When not all players claim, the divisor is larger than the number of recipients, causing each claimant to receive a smaller share than they should. The undistributed difference is permanently locked in the Pot contract.

// src/Pot.sol:57-60
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
@> uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; // @> divides by TOTAL players
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { // @> but only distributes to CLAIMANTS
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Any contest where some players fail to call claimCut() before the 90-day window closes. It's extremely likely in public competitions with large player pools, abandoned accounts, or lost keys

Impact:

  • The difference between i_players.length and claimants.length creates a permanent fund leak. With 5 players and 2 claimants: claimantCut = pool / 5 but only 2 × claimantCut is distributed, permanently locking 60% of the unclaimed reward pool

  • In the PoC: 50 ether funded, 20 claimed, 30 remaining → 16.2 ether (54%) permanently locked with no recovery mechanism

Proof of Concept

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {ContestManager} from "../../src/ContestManager.sol";
import {Pot} from "../../src/Pot.sol";
import {Test} from "lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol";
import {IERC20} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {ERC20Mock} from "../ERC20Mock.sol";
/// @title PoC: Fund Loss — claimantCut divides by i_players.length, not claimants.length
contract PocPrecisionLoss is Test {
ContestManager public cm;
ERC20Mock public token;
address public owner = makeAddr("owner");
event Result(string message, uint256 value);
function setUp() public {
vm.startPrank(owner);
cm = new ContestManager();
token = new ERC20Mock("WETH", "WETH", owner, 100_000_000 ether);
token.approve(address(cm), type(uint256).max);
vm.stopPrank();
}
function test_PoC_UnclaimedFundsLocked() public {
// 5 players with 10 ether each, only 2 claim
address[] memory players = new address[](5);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
players[i] = makeAddr(string(abi.encodePacked("player", vm.toString(i))));
}
uint256[] memory rewards = new uint256[](5);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
rewards[i] = 10 ether;
}
vm.startPrank(owner);
token.mint(owner, 50 ether);
address potAddr = cm.createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(address(token)), 50 ether);
cm.fundContest(0);
vm.stopPrank();
// Only 2 of 5 players claim
vm.prank(players[0]);
Pot(potAddr).claimCut();
vm.prank(players[1]);
Pot(potAddr).claimCut();
emit Result("remainingRewards:", Pot(potAddr).getRemainingRewards()); // 30 ether
emit Result("Pot balance:", token.balanceOf(potAddr)); // 30 ether
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days);
vm.prank(owner);
cm.closeContest(potAddr);
uint256 potBalanceAfter = token.balanceOf(potAddr);
emit Result("Pot balance after close:", potBalanceAfter); // 16.2 ether locked
assertGt(potBalanceAfter, 0, "Funds permanently locked in Pot");
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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