MyCut

AI First Flight #8
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Incorrect divisor in `closePot` causes unclaimed rewards to be permanently locked in the contract

Description

Pot::closePot is designed to be called by the manager after the 90-day claim window ends. When called, it takes a manager's cut from the unclaimed rewards and redistributes the leftover pot equally among players who claimed in time. However, the calculation of each claimant's share uses the wrong divisor, causing a portion of the leftover pot to be permanently locked in the contract whenever not every player claims.

## Root Cause In `Pot::closePot`, the leftover rewards (after the manager's cut) are divided by `i_players.length` (the total number of players originally allocated a reward) instead of `claimants.length` (the number of players who actually claimed within the 90-day window).

uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Every time closePot is called and fewer players claimed than were originally allocated, which is the default scenario the 90-day claim window and redistribution mechanism are designed to handle.

  • No attacker action, no unusual state, and no external precondition is required for this to occur. The bug is triggered automatically by the flow the protocol expects.

Impact:

  • The undistributed portion of the leftover rewards is permanently locked in the Pot contract. Once closePot executes, no function in Pot or ContestManager can move the stuck tokens.

  • The loss scales with how many players fail to claim in time. In a Pot with 10 allocated players and only 3 claimants, roughly 70% of the leftover rewards become permanently stuck.

Proof of Concept

The following walkthrough demonstrates how funds become permanently stuck under normal protocol operation when `closePot` executes with fewer claimants than originally allocated players.
Assume the following state at the time `closePot` is called:
- `remainingRewards = 1000`
- `managerCutPercent = 10` → `managerCut = 100`
- Leftover after manager cut = 900
- `i_players.length = 10`
- `claimants.length = 3` (only 3 of 10 players claimed in time)
Calculation in the current code:
- `claimantCut = 900 / 10 = 90`
- Total distributed = `90 * 3 = 270`
- Permanently stuck in the contract = `900 - 270 = 630` tokens

Recommended Mitigation

Change the divisor from `i_players.length` to `claimants.length` so leftover rewards are split only among players who actually claimed within the 90-day window:
```solidity
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
```
Additionally, handle the edge case where `claimants.length == 0` (no players claimed at all). The current logic would revert on division by zero, locking both the manager cut and the entire leftover pot permanently.
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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