MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`Pot::closePot` divides the remaining rewards by total players instead of claimants — tokens get permanently stuck

Root + Impact

Description

The protocol spec says when a pot closes, unclaimed rewards should be split equally among the people who actually claimed in time. But the code divides by i_players.length (everyone) instead of claimants.length (only those who claimed). Since the loop only iterates over claimants, fewer portions are sent than the denominator assumes, and the difference stays trapped in the contract with no way out.

// src/Pot.sol
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// should be claimants.length
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}

Risk

Likelihood: This happens every single time a pot closes with unclaimed rewards. The more players that miss the 90-day window, the worse the loss.

Impact: A chunk of the reward pool is permanently locked in the Pot contract. Nobody — not the manager, not the claimants — can ever retrieve it. In a 10-player pot where only 1 person claims, over 70% of the remaining rewards get stuck.


Proof of Concept

3 players, rewards of 300/300/400, total = 1000. Only player1 claims.

After closePot:

  • Manager gets 70 (10% of 700 remaining)

  • claimantCut = 630 / 3 = 210 (divided by 3 players, not 1 claimant)

  • Only player1 receives 210

  • 420 tokens stuck forever — should've been 0

function testH01_WrongDenominatorInClosePot() public {
address[] memory players = new address[](3);
players[0] = player1; players[1] = player2; players[2] = player3;
uint256[] memory rewards = new uint256[](3);
rewards[0] = 300e18; rewards[1] = 300e18; rewards[2] = 400e18;
vm.startPrank(owner);
address contest = conMan.createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(weth), 1000e18);
conMan.fundContest(0);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.prank(player1);
Pot(contest).claimCut();
vm.warp(91 days);
vm.prank(owner);
conMan.closeContest(contest);
uint256 stuck = weth.balanceOf(contest);
assertTrue(stuck > 0); // 420e18 permanently stuck
}

Recommended Mitigation

Divide by the number of people who actually claimed, not the total roster.

- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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