MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

closePot() Divides by i_players.length Instead of claimants.length Causing Tokens to Be Permanently Stuck

Root + Impact

Description

  • closePot() is designed to distribute the remaining unclaimed rewards after 90 days — giving the manager a 10% cut and splitting the rest equally among claimants who claimed on time.

  • The function divides the claimant distribution by i_players.length (all registered players) instead of claimants.length (only those who actually called claimCut()). When fewer players claim than are registered, each claimant receives less than their fair share and the difference is permanently stuck in the contract with no recovery path.

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
// @> i_players.length = ALL registered players (e.g. 2)
// @> claimants.length = ONLY players who called claimCut() (e.g. 1)
// @> Divides by 2 when only 1 person claimed → half the tokens distributed
// @> Remaining half is permanently stuck — no function can recover it
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • This triggers in every pot where at least one registered player does not call claimCut() before the 90-day window — a normal and expected scenario in any real distribution

  • There is no mechanism to force all players to claim, so partial claims are the default case, not the exception

Impact: High

  • Claimants receive less than their entitled share of the remaining rewards on every partial claim scenario

  • The undistributed tokens are permanently locked in the Pot contract — there is no rescue, sweep, or secondary distribution function to recover them

Proof of Concept

The test below uses the exact reward values from the existing test suite. Two players are registered with 500 tokens each. Only player1 claims before the pot closes. When closePot() is called, player1 should receive all 450 remaining tokens (500 unclaimed minus 10% manager cut). Instead, the bug causes only 225 to be sent — half the correct amount — and 225 tokens are permanently locked in the contract.

function test_WrongDivisorLocksTokens() public mintAndApproveTokens {
rewards = [500, 500];
totalRewards = 1000;
vm.startPrank(user);
contest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest(
players, rewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), totalRewards
);
ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0);
vm.stopPrank();
// Only player1 claims — player2 does not
vm.prank(player1);
Pot(contest).claimCut();
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days);
uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(player1);
vm.prank(user);
ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(contest);
uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(player1);
uint256 contractBalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(contest);
// player1 should have received (500 - 50) = 450 but got 225
// 225 tokens are stuck in the contract forever
assertEq(contractBalanceAfter, 225); // tokens permanently stuck
assertLt(player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore, 450); // underpaid
}

Recommended Mitigation

The fix is a single word change — replace i_players.length with claimants.length so the remaining rewards are divided only among those who actually participated. This ensures no tokens are left undistributed.

- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;

Note: a guard for claimants.length == 0 should also be added to handle the edge case where nobody claimed, to prevent a division-by-zero revert.

+ if (claimants.length == 0) return;
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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