MyCut

AI First Flight #8
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`Pot::closePot` divides the leftover pool by `i_players.length` instead of `claimants.length`, permanently stranding tokens in the Pot

Severity: H · Impact: H · Likelihood: H

Description

  • After the 90-day window the manager calls closePot, which should take its cut and split the remaining pool equally among the players who actually claimed in time.

  • Instead, the claimant share is divided by i_players.length (the full roster) rather than claimants.length (those who claimed). Because claimants.length <= i_players.length, every claimant is under-paid and the un-distributed remainder is left in the contract with no withdrawal path — it is locked forever.

// src/Pot.sol:L53-L60
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
@> uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; // should be claimants.length
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}

Risk

Likelihood

  • Occurs on every contest that closes with at least one player who did not claim (i.e. claimants.length < i_players.length) — the normal, expected end-state of the protocol.

Impact

  • Direct loss of user funds: the leftover pool is split too thinly and the difference is permanently locked. In the PoC below, 23 of 50 remaining tokens (46%) are stranded in a single close.

Proof of Concept

Save as test/PoC_H01.t.sol and run forge test --mt test_wrongDivisorLocksFunds -vv. Four players are each allocated 25 (total 100); only two claim; after close, 23 tokens are stuck in the Pot.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {Test, console} from "lib/forge-std/src/Test.sol";
import {ERC20} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {IERC20} from "lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
import {ContestManager} from "../src/ContestManager.sol";
import {Pot} from "../src/Pot.sol";
contract MockERC20 is ERC20 {
constructor() ERC20("Mock", "MCK") {}
function mint(address to, uint256 amt) external { _mint(to, amt); }
}
contract PoC_H01 is Test {
function test_wrongDivisorLocksFunds() public {
ContestManager cm = new ContestManager(); // owner = address(this)
MockERC20 token = new MockERC20();
// 4 players, each allocated 25 => total 100
address[] memory players = new address[](4);
uint256[] memory rewards = new uint256[](4);
for (uint160 i = 0; i < 4; i++) { players[i] = address(uint160(0x1000 + i)); rewards[i] = 25; }
token.mint(address(this), 100);
token.approve(address(cm), 100);
address pot = cm.createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(address(token)), 100);
cm.fundContest(0);
// only 2 of the 4 players claim in time => claimants.length = 2, i_players.length = 4
vm.prank(players[0]); Pot(pot).claimCut();
vm.prank(players[1]); Pot(pot).claimCut();
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days);
cm.closeContest(pot);
// src/Pot.sol:L57 computes (50 - 5) / 4 = 11 per claimant; correct (/2) would be 22.
// 23 of the 50 leftover tokens are now permanently stranded in the Pot.
console.log("stranded in pot:", token.balanceOf(pot));
assertEq(token.balanceOf(pot), 23);
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

Divide the leftover by the number of addresses that actually claimed, so the whole remainder is distributed (guard the empty-claimant case, since it would divide by zero).

// src/Pot.sol:L57
- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ require(claimants.length > 0, "Pot: no claimants");
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;

Validation: re-run the PoC after the fix — the stranded balance drops from 23 to ≤1 (rounding dust only).

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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