MyCut

AI First Flight #8
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

closePot() divides the remaining pool by the total number of players instead of the number of claimants, underpaying claimants and locking most of the remainder forever

Root + Impact

The documented distribution says that after the 90-day claim window, the manager takes a 10% cut of what is left "and the remainder is distributed equally to those who claimed in time". closePot() computes each claimant's share by dividing by i_players.length, the total number of players in the contest, including everyone who never claimed. It then pays that too-small share only to the actual claimants. The difference is never paid to anyone and there is no sweep or second distribution path, so it stays locked in the Pot forever. The fewer people claim, the larger the locked fraction: if only 1 of 4 players claims, the sole claimant receives about 17% of the remainder instead of the ~90% they were promised, and over half of the whole pot is stranded.

Description

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) {
revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
}
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
// @> uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; // wrong divisor
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); // pays the small share to claimants only
}
}
}

The divisor must be claimants.length for the loop above it to distribute the full remainder; using the player count pays out only claimants/players of the intended amount and strands the rest.

Risk

Likelihood: High - deterministic whenever at least one authorized player does not claim, which is the normal case this closing logic exists for. No attacker is needed; the loss happens on the intended owner flow.
Impact: High - permanent loss of a large, predictable fraction of every contest's pool (50.6 of 100 tokens in the verified 4-player/1-claimant scenario). Claimants who followed the rules are shorted most of their redistribution, and the stranded tokens can never leave the Pot.

Proof of Concept

Verified with Foundry (test passes). A 100-token pot with 4 players at 25 each; only player 1 claims in time. After 91 days the owner closes the pot. Player 1 ends with 41.875 tokens (25 claim + 16.875 redistribution) instead of 92.5 (25 + 67.5), and 50.625 tokens remain in the Pot with no way to distribute them.

assertEq(token.balanceOf(p1), 41.875e18); // should be 92.5e18
assertEq(token.balanceOf(potAddr), 50.625e18); // locked forever

Recommended Mitigation

Divide by the number of claimants:

- uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length;
+ uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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