MyCut

AI First Flight #8
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Title: `Pot::closePot` never resets `remainingRewards` or marks the pot closed, so it can be called repeatedly to re-pay the manager cut and claimants

Description

When the claim period ends, closePot is meant to take the manager cut and then split the
remaining unclaimed rewards among the addresses that actually claimed (claimants). But it
sizes each share by dividing by i_players.length (the total number of players) while
the payout loop only runs over claimants:

function closePot() external onlyOwner {
if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim();
if (remainingRewards > 0) {
uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent;
i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut);
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; // @> wrong denominator
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { // only pays claimants
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}
}

Because claimants.length <= i_players.length, each claimantCut is scaled down by the
total player count instead of the (smaller) claimant count. The loop pays that too-small
share to each claimant, so the total distributed is far less than remainingRewards - managerCut. The leftover stays in the Pot, and no other function can move it out — the
tokens are locked permanently.

Risk

Likelihood: High — this happens in the ordinary case: whenever not every player has
claimed before closePot. That is the expected situation (the leftover distribution exists
precisely to handle unclaimed rewards). No attacker or special condition is required.

Impact: High — a large portion of real reward tokens is frozen in the contract forever,
with no recovery path. The rightful claimants are underpaid and the remainder is
permanently unrecoverable (freezing of funds).

Proof of Concept

4 players each owed 25 (100 total); only 1 claims; after 90 days the manager closes the
pot. With the correct denominator the pot should end at 0, but ~50.6 of 100 stay locked.
Full, self-contained test (passes):

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
​
import {Test, console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {ContestManager} from "../src/ContestManager.sol";
import {Pot} from "../src/Pot.sol";
import {IERC20} from "openzeppelin-contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import {ERC20Mock} from "./ERC20Mock.sol";
​
contract MyCutStuckFundsPoCTest is Test {
ContestManager manager;
ERC20Mock weth;
address owner = makeAddr("owner");
address p1 = makeAddr("p1");
address p2 = makeAddr("p2");
address p3 = makeAddr("p3");
address p4 = makeAddr("p4");
​
function setUp() public {
vm.startPrank(owner);
manager = new ContestManager();
weth = new ERC20Mock("WETH", "WETH", owner, 0);
weth.mint(owner, 100 ether);
vm.stopPrank();
}
​
function test_fundsStuckWhenNotAllClaim() public {
address[] memory players = new address[](4);
players[0] = p1; players[1] = p2; players[2] = p3; players[3] = p4;
uint256[] memory rewards = new uint256[](4);
rewards[0] = 25 ether; rewards[1] = 25 ether; rewards[2] = 25 ether; rewards[3] = 25 ether;
​
vm.startPrank(owner);
address pot = manager.createContest(players, rewards, IERC20(address(weth)), 100 ether);
weth.approve(address(manager), 100 ether);
manager.fundContest(0);
vm.stopPrank();
​
vm.prank(p1);
Pot(pot).claimCut(); // only 1 of 4 players claims
​
vm.warp(block.timestamp + 90 days + 1);
vm.prank(owner);
manager.closeContest(pot);
​
uint256 stuck = weth.balanceOf(pot);
console.log("locked in Pot:", stuck);
assertGt(stuck, 0); // ~50.6 ether locked forever (should be 0)
}
}

Math: after p1 claims, remainingRewards = 75. In closePot:
managerCut = 75 / 10 = 7.5; claimantCut = (75 - 7.5) / i_players.length(4) = 67.5 / 4 = 16.875, paid to the single claimant → 7.5 + 16.875 = 24.375 leaves the pot, so
75 - 24.375 = 50.625 stays locked. With the correct denominator claimants.length = 1:
claimantCut = 67.5, the pot pays 7.5 + 67.5 = 75, ending at 0.

Recommended Mitigation

Divide by the number of actual claimants, and guard the empty-claimant case:

if (claimants.length > 0) {
uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) {
_transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut);
}
}

Additionally, track and sweep any integer-division dust (e.g. send the remainder to the
manager, or re-add it to remainingRewards) so no tokens can ever be stranded in the pot.


Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] Incorrect logic in `Pot::closePot` leads to unfair distribution to `claimants`, potentially locking the funds with no way to take that out

## Description in `closePot` function while calclulating the shares for claimaint cut, `i_players.length` is used, instead of `claimants.length`, causing low amount being distributed to claimants. ## Vulnerability Details [2024-08-MyCut/src/Pot.sol at main · Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut (github.com)](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-MyCut/blob/main/src/Pot.sol#L57) `Pot::closePot` function is meant to be called once contest passed 90 days, it sends the owner cut to owner and rest is splitted among the users who claimed b/w 90 days period. However, current implementation is wrong.&#x20; It uses total users (i_players.length) instead of the users (claimants.length) who claimed during the duration. This creates an unfair distribution to the participants and some of the funds could be locked in the contract. In worst case scenerio, it could be 90% if nobody has claimed from the protocol during the 90 days duration. ## POC In existing test suite, add following test: ```solidity function testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() public mintAndApproveTokens { // Setup address[] memory testPlayers = new address[](3); testPlayers[0] = makeAddr("player1"); testPlayers[1] = makeAddr("player2"); testPlayers[2] = makeAddr("player3"); uint256[] memory testRewards = new uint256[](3); testRewards[0] = 400; testRewards[1] = 300; testRewards[2] = 300; uint256 testTotalRewards = 1000; // Create and fund the contest vm.startPrank(user); address testContest = ContestManager(conMan).createContest( testPlayers, testRewards, IERC20(ERC20Mock(weth)), testTotalRewards ); ContestManager(conMan).fundContest(0); vm.stopPrank(); // Only player1 claims their reward vm.prank(testPlayers[0]); Pot(testContest).claimCut(); // Fast forward 91 days vm.warp(block.timestamp + 91 days); // Record balances before closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceBefore = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf( testPlayers[0] ); // Close the contest vm.prank(user); ContestManager(conMan).closeContest(testContest); // Check balances after closing the pot uint256 player1BalanceAfter = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(testPlayers[0]); // Calculate expected distributions uint256 remainingRewards = 600; // 300 + 300 unclaimed rewards uint256 ownerCut = remainingRewards / 10; // 10% of remaining rewards uint256 distributionPerPlayer = (remainingRewards - ownerCut) / 1; // as only 1 user claimed uint256 fundStucked = ERC20Mock(weth).balanceOf(address(testContest)); // actual results console.log("expected reward:", distributionPerPlayer); console.log( "actual reward:", player1BalanceAfter - player1BalanceBefore ); console.log("Fund stucked:", fundStucked); } ``` then run `forge test --mt testUnfairDistributionInClosePot -vv` in the terminal and it will show following output: ```js [⠊] Compiling... [⠒] Compiling 1 files with Solc 0.8.20 [⠘] Solc 0.8.20 finished in 1.63s Compiler run successful! Ran 1 test for test/TestMyCut.t.sol:TestMyCut [PASS] testUnfairDistributionInClosePot() (gas: 905951) Logs: User Address: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Contest Manager Address 1: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 Minting tokens to: 0x6CA6d1e2D5347Bfab1d91e883F1915560e09129D Approved tokens to: 0x7BD1119CEC127eeCDBa5DCA7d1Bd59986f6d7353 expected reward: 540 actual reward: 180 Fund stucked: 360 Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 1.58ms (506.33µs CPU time) ``` ## Impact Loss of funds, Unfair distribution b/w users ## Recommendations Fix the functions as shown below: ```diff function closePot() external onlyOwner { if (block.timestamp - i_deployedAt < 90 days) { revert Pot__StillOpenForClaim(); } if (remainingRewards > 0) { uint256 managerCut = remainingRewards / managerCutPercent; i_token.transfer(msg.sender, managerCut); - uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / i_players.length; + uint256 totalClaimants = claimants.length; + if(totalClaimant == 0){ + _transferReward(msg.sender, remainingRewards - managerCut); + } else { + uint256 claimantCut = (remainingRewards - managerCut) / claimants.length; for (uint256 i = 0; i < claimants.length; i++) { _transferReward(claimants[i], claimantCut); } } + } } ```

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