Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Unbounded loop in `enterRaffle` causes Denial of Service (DoS), preventing new users from participating

Unbounded loop in enterRaffle causes Denial of Service (DoS), preventing new users from participating

Description

To prevent the same address from entering twice with a single payment, the enterRaffle function uses two nested for loops that iterate through the entire players array. This means that for every new player, all previously registered players are scanned

@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}

Risk

  • Likelihood: High. It requires no specific "attack"; normal user behavior over time will inevitably trigger the DoS condition as the array grows.

  • Severity: Medium. The protocol's core entry mechanism will become permanently broken, but existing funds are not immediately stolen (though participation is bricked).

Impact:

The algorithm's complexity is . As the raffle grows in popularity and the player list increases, the gas cost required to validate new users will multiply drastically. Eventually, a transaction to enterRaffle will consume more gas than the allowed Block Gas Limit, creating a permanent Denial of Service state. No new users will be able to join the lottery.

Proof of Concept

The following test demonstrates how the gas cost increases as the number of players grows.

function testDenialOfService() public {
vm.txGasPrice(1);
// 1. First 100 players
uint160 playersNum = 100;
address[] memory players = new address[](playersNum);
for (uint160 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
players[i] = address(i + 1);
}
uint256 gasStart = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * playersNum}(players);
uint256 gasEnd = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedFirst100 = (gasStart - gasEnd);
// 2. Next 100 players
address[] memory players2 = new address[](playersNum);
for (uint160 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
players2[i] = address(i + playersNum + 1);
}
uint256 gasStart2 = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * playersNum}(players2);
uint256 gasEnd2 = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedSecond100 = (gasStart2 - gasEnd2);
assertGt(gasUsedSecond100, gasUsedFirst100);
}

The test confirms that the first 100 players consume a reasonable amount of gas, but the next 100 users cost significantly more, showing scaling issues due to the nested loop.

Recommended Mitigation

Change the data structure. Instead of iterating through arrays, use a mapping to record who has entered, reducing the time complexity to .

+ mapping(address => bool) public hasEntered;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
+ require(!hasEntered[newPlayers[i]], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
+ hasEntered[newPlayers[i]] = true;
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
- // Remove the nested for loops
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 4 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!