Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

M-02 — Two refunds create duplicate zero-addresses, permanently blocking entry

Root + Impact

Description

Fees are stored in a uint64 and added with an unchecked narrowing cast. When a
fee exceeds type(uint64).max, uint64(fee) silently truncates modulo 2^64,
and the addition wraps (Solidity 0.7.6 has no overflow checks). Recorded fees
then diverge from reality, and withdrawFees' strict balance equality can never
be satisfied, locking ETH.

address public feeAddress;
// @> Too narrow: fees can exceed uint64; silent truncation on cast
uint64 public totalFees = 0;
...
// @> uint64(fee) truncates and `+` wraps silently (0.7.6)
totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
...
require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");

Risk

Likelihood: Medium — requires a sufficiently large entranceFee/player count so that the 20% fee exceeds ~1.84e19 wei (~18.4 ETH). Feasible for high-value raffles.

Impact: Medium — fee accounting is corrupted and withdrawFees reverts (balance ≠ truncated totalFees), permanently locking protocol fees. If totalFees wraps to a value equal to balance by coincidence, it could overpay/underpay.

Proof of Concept

// test/Exploit.t.sol
function testTotalFeesTruncation() public {
uint256 bigFee = 3e19; // 30 ETH per ticket
PuppyRaffle r = new PuppyRaffle(bigFee, feeAddress, duration);
​
vm.deal(address(this), bigFee * 4);
address[] memory players = new address[](4);
players[0] = playerOne; players[1] = playerTwo;
players[2] = playerThree; players[3] = playerFour;
r.enterRaffle{value: bigFee * 4}(players);
​
vm.warp(block.timestamp + duration + 1);
vm.roll(block.number + 1);
r.selectWinner();
​
uint256 expectedFee = (bigFee * 4 * 20) / 100; // 2.4e19 > uint64 max
assertLt(r.totalFees(), expectedFee); // truncated
assertEq(uint256(r.totalFees()), uint256(uint64(expectedFee)));
}

Result: [PASS] testTotalFeesTruncation() — totalFees equals the truncated value, not the true 2.4e19.

Recommended Mitigation

Widen the type to uint256 and drop the narrowing cast. On 0.7.x also use
SafeMath (or migrate to >=0.8.0) to prevent wraps.

- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
@@
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee; // uint256, no truncation
@@
- require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");
+ require(address(this).balance == totalFees, "PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");
+ // Consider `>=` and transferring `totalFees` to tolerate stray ETH

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 42 minutes ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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