The PuppyRaffle::totalFees variable is declared as uint64, but accumulates fees calculated as uint256. When fees exceed type(uint64).max (18.4 ETH), the variable silently overflows back to zero, causing permanent loss of fee tracking and funds for the protocol owner.
The Problem:
uint64 max value: 18,446,744,073,709,551,615 wei (≈ 18.4 ETH)
With 1 ETH entrance fee and 100 players: fee = 20 ETH
After first raffle: totalFees overflows and wraps to ~1.6 ETH
Protocol owner loses 18.4 ETH immediately
Likelihood: Medium - Requires substantial raffle participation (100 players at 1 ETH or equivalent), but very likely in any successful deployment.
Impact: High - Permanent loss of protocol fees. Owner cannot recover accumulated fees above 18.4 ETH.
Scenario:
Deploy PuppyRaffle with entranceFee = 1 ether
100 players enter: Total = 100 ETH
selectWinner() called:
Fee calculated: 20 ETH (20% of 100 ETH)
Cast to uint64: Overflows to ~1.55 ETH
Lost: ~18.45 ETH
Owner calls withdrawFees():
Tries to withdraw 1.55 ETH instead of 20 ETH
18.45 ETH permanently lost
Manual review, Solidity type analysis
Change totalFees from uint64 to uint256:
Why This Works:
uint256 can hold up to 2^256-1 wei (≈10^59 ETH)
No overflow possible in any realistic scenario
Slightly higher gas cost (~20k gas one-time due to storage slot change) is negligible compared to preventing fee loss
Note: The comment "We do some storage packing to save gas" is misleading - address (160 bits) + uint64 (64 bits) = 224 bits, which doesn't actually pack into a single 256-bit storage slot efficiently alongside the address. The gas savings are minimal and not worth the overflow risk.
## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.
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