Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

uint64 truncation of totalFees permanently locks protocol fees

Root + Impact

Description

uint64 public totalFees = 0;
...
function selectWinner() external {
...
uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100;
@> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); // uint64(fee) truncates when fee > type(uint64).max
...
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium — requires a raffle to reach ~93 players (at a 1 ETH fee), so a single large fee exceeds type(uint64).max. Reachable in a successful raffle, but not in every one.

Impact: High — totalFees is corrupted, so withdrawFees() reverts on its strict balance-equality check. The protocol's fees are permanently locked with no recovery path.

Proof of Concept

This test enters 93 players, runs the draw, and shows two things: totalFees is
recorded as ~0.15 ETH instead of the real 18.6 ETH (truncation), and
withdrawFees() then reverts (locked funds). The assertLt confirms the
truncation; the vm.expectRevert confirms the fees can no longer be withdrawn.

function test_fee_overflow_locks_withdrawals() public {
uint256 playerCount = 93;
address[] memory players = new address[](playerCount);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < playerCount; i++) {
players[i] = address(uint160(i + 1));
}
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * playerCount}(players);
vm.warp(block.timestamp + duration + 1);
puppyRaffle.selectWinner();
​
uint256 feesRecorded = puppyRaffle.totalFees();
uint256 feesExpected = (entranceFee * playerCount * 20) / 100; // 18.6 ETH
assertLt(feesRecorded, feesExpected); // recorded << real: truncation
​
vm.expectRevert("PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");
puppyRaffle.withdrawFees();
}
​
From the trace: totalFees() returns 153255926290448384 (~0.15 ETH),
while the real fees collected are 18.6 ETH. withdrawFees() then reverts.

Recommended Mitigation

Store totalFees as uint256 to remove the narrowing cast and the truncation.
Upgrading to Solidity >=0.8 adds automatic overflow checks as defense in depth.
The strict-equality require in withdrawFees() should also be reconsidered, as
it is independently fragile to forced ETH via selfdestruct.

- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
...
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 14 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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