Likelihood: Medium — requires a raffle to reach ~93 players (at a 1 ETH fee), so a single large fee exceeds type(uint64).max. Reachable in a successful raffle, but not in every one.
Impact: High — totalFees is corrupted, so withdrawFees() reverts on its strict balance-equality check. The protocol's fees are permanently locked with no recovery path.
This test enters 93 players, runs the draw, and shows two things: totalFees is
recorded as ~0.15 ETH instead of the real 18.6 ETH (truncation), and
withdrawFees() then reverts (locked funds). The assertLt confirms the
truncation; the vm.expectRevert confirms the fees can no longer be withdrawn.
Store totalFees as uint256 to remove the narrowing cast and the truncation.
Upgrading to Solidity >=0.8 adds automatic overflow checks as defense in depth.
The strict-equality require in withdrawFees() should also be reconsidered, as
it is independently fragile to forced ETH via selfdestruct.
## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.
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