Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[H-03] totalFees uint64 overflow silently zeroes accumulated fees

Root + Impact

Description

  • totalFees accumulates protocol fees each round. Because it is typed as uint64 a Solidity 0.7.6, which has no built-in overflow protection, the counter wraps to zero once it surpasses ~18.4 ETH.

  • The owner then withdraws far less than the actual fees earned.

@> uint64 public totalFees = 0;
// Inside selectWinner():
@> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); // explicit narrowing cast + no overflow check

Risk

Likelihood:

  • With entranceFee = 1 ETH and 100 players, a single round produces a fee of 20 ETH, which already exceeds uint64 max on the very first call

  • Any raffle with a prize pool larger than ~92 ETH triggers overflow

Impact:

  • The owner receives a fraction of the fees actually owed, potentially near zero after overflow

  • The loss is silent; no revert or event signals the corruption

Proof of Concept

With a standard entranceFee = 1 ETH and 100 players, the single-round fee already exceeds uint64 max, so totalFees is silently truncated from round one.

entranceFee = 1 ETH, 100 players
fee (uint256) = 100e18 * 20 / 100 = 20e18 wei
uint64 max = 18_446_744_073_709_551_615 (~18.4e18 wei)
uint64(20e18) = 1_553_255_926_290_448_384 ← silently truncated on round 1

Recommended Mitigation

Change totalFees to uint256 and remove the narrowing cast so fees accumulate without any ceiling or truncation.

- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 5 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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