Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

huge potential risk for Denie l of service (Dos) attac here `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle`

The loop at plyer arrayes for the dup checks here `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` its huge potential risk for Denie l of service (Dos) attac, causing a severe increase for gas coast for the new players.

Description

The `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` fucntiom making a loop for the `players` array to make sure that there is no dup accounts. But lets focus on the main case here, The longer the `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` is being used, the more checks is being made on the new players, which means the more gas is being used and thats our main issue here that who got entered the raffle first will have to pay a little gas but for those who are new that will be a huge num of gas for them which is not fair and making this contract not usable at all.
```solidty
// @audit Dos attack
@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
```

Risk

Impact:


  • The gas coast for entrance will be increased in a huge way as more player entering the raffle. Which will make a low user have like a huge advantege just for joining before the others and that will reduce the num of users using the contract.

  • The attacker can take the `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` and making it too big that no one else enter the raffle which means that we have a cheater winner!!!

Place the following to the `PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol`.
```solidity
function testDenialOfService() public {
// Creates 100 addresses
uint256 playersNum = 100;
address[] memory players = new address[](playersNum);
for(uint i = 0; i < players.length; i++){
players[i] = address(i);
}
// Gas calculations for first 100 players
uint256 gasStart = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(players);
uint256 gasEnd = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedFirst = (gasStart - gasEnd) * tx.gasprice;
console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 players: ", gasUsedFirst);
// Creates another array of 100 players
address[] memory playersTwo = new address[](playersNum);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersTwo.length; i++) {
playersTwo[i] = address(i + playersNum);
}
// Gas calculations for second 100 players
uint256 gasStartTwo = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(players);
uint256 gasEndTwo = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedSecond = (gasStart - gasEnd) * tx.gasprice;
console.log("Gas cost of the second 100 players: ", gasUsedSecond);
assert(gasUsedFirst < gasUsedSecond);
}
```

Recommended Mitigation

Here we are to our recommendation for fixes!!!!
1- consider allowing dup, why? the dup check doesnt stop any user from creating another wallet to enter the raffle so anyways its not providing any solution.
2- Try another way to make the checks and I am recommending using mapping to make sure that the user has already entered the raffle before.
```diff
+ mapping(address => uint256) public addressToRaffleId;
+ uint256 public raffleId = 0;
.
.
.
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
+ addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = raffleId;
}
- // Check for duplicates
+ // Check for duplicates only from the new players
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
+ require(addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] != raffleId, "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
+ }
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
- for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
- require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
- }
- }
emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers);
}
.
.
.
function selectWinner() external {
+ raffleId = raffleId + 1;
require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
```
3- Alternatively, you could use OpenZeppelin's `EnumerableSet` library
from here (https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/5.x/api/utils#EnumerableSet).
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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