Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Looking through players array to check duplicate in `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` is a potential denial of service attack, incrementing gas cost for future entrants.

Root + Impact

Description

  • Describe the normal behavior in one or more sentences

  • Explain the specific issue or problem in one or more sentences

**Description:** The `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` function loops through the `players` array to check for duplicatas. however the longer the `PuppyRaffle::players` array is, the more the checks a new player will have to make. This means the gas costs for players who enter right when the raffle starts will be dramatically lower than who enter later. Any additional address in the `players` array, is an additional array the loop will have to make.
``` solidity
//@audit - DoS Attack
@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
```

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Reason 1 // Describe WHEN this will occur (avoid using "if" statements)

  • Reason 2

Impact:

  • Impact 1

  • Impact 2

Proof of Concept

**Proof of Concept:**
If we have 2 sets of 100 enter, the gas cost will be as such:
- first 100 players = ~6329447 gas
- second 100 players = ~18809991 gas
This 3x more expensive than the first 100 players.
<details>
<summary>PoC</summary>
Paste the following test into the `PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol`.
```solidity
function testDoS() public {
uint256 startingGas = gasleft();
address[] memory players = new address[](100);
for(uint256 i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
players[i] = address(i + 1);
}
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(players);
uint256 gasEnd = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedFirstSetOfPlayers = startingGas - gasEnd;
console.log("Gas cost of the first set of players:", gasUsedFirstSetOfPlayers);
//now for the second 100 players
uint256 gasStarting2 = gasleft();
address[] memory players2 = new address[](100);
for(uint256 i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
players2[i] = address(i + 101);
}
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players2.length}(players2);
uint256 gasEnd2 = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedSecondSetOfPlayers = gasStarting2 - gasEnd2;
console.log("Gas cost of the second set of players:", gasUsedSecondSetOfPlayers );
assert(gasUsedFirstSetOfPlayers < gasUsedSecondSetOfPlayers);
}
```
</details>

Recommended Mitigation

**Recommended Mitigation:** There are few recommendations
1. consider allowing duplicates: users can make new wallets addresses anyways, so a duplicate check doesn't prevent the same person from entering multiple times, only the same wallet address.
2. consider using a mapping to check for duplicates. This would allow a constant time lookup of whether a user has already entered.
```diff
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
- for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
- require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
- }
- }
+ require(!isRegisteredPlayer[msg.sender], "already a registered player");
+ isRegisteredPlayer [msg.sender] = true;
```
Alternatively, you could use [Openzeppelin's `EnumerableSet` library]
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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