uint64 overflow in fee accounting causes permanent loss of feesThe contract accumulates protocol fees in totalFees, typed as uint64, and the owner later withdraws them via withdrawFees.
When fee (a uint256) is cast to uint64 and added to totalFees, any value exceeding type(uint64).max (~18.4 ETH) silently truncates. On Solidity ^0.7.6 there is no built-in overflow protection, so the accounting silently corrupts. The owner ends up withdrawing far less than was actually collected.
Likelihood: Medium
This triggers whenever accumulated fees across a single raffle round exceed ~18.4 ETH, which is plausible with a large number of participants or a high entrance fee.
The protocol growing in popularity directly increases the likelihood of hitting this threshold.
Impact: High
The feeAddress receives significantly less ETH than earned, with no way to recover the difference.
The discrepancy is silent — the owner has no way to detect this has occurred from on-chain state alone.
The overflow will cause the integer to wrap back to 0 and lose all the information it had stored, and all the fees along with it.
Change totalFees to uint256. There is no gas-saving justification for uint64 here since it shares a storage slot with feeAddress (a 20-byte address), but the risk far outweighs any marginal benefit.
## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.
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