Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Found a potential DoS attack due to unboaunded for-loop in `PuppyRaffle::enterRaffle` incrementing gas costs for future entrants

Description: The unbounded for-loop

// Check for duplicates
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}

checks for duplicate addresses. However, as more players enter the raffle, the longer the PuppyRaffle::players array gets, the more checks have to be made for the new player to enter.

Impact:
This can lead to future participants being unable to enter the Raffle due to high gas costs and causing a rush at the beginning to the one of the first entrants. An attacker might make the PuppyRaffle::players array so big that no one else is able to participate leading guaranteeing themselves the win.

Proof of Concept:

PoC Put the following test in the `PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol`
function testDoSattack() public {
// Let's enter the First 100 players
uint256 playersNum = 100;
address[] memory players = new address[](playersNum);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
players[i] = address(i); // this is how we create 100 players with different addresses
}
uint256 gasStart = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(players);
uint256 gasEnd = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsed = (gasStart - gasEnd);
console2.log("Gas Cost of the First 100 players:", gasUsed);
// Let's enter the Second 100 players
address[] memory playersTwo = new address[](playersNum);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < playersNum; i++) {
players[i] = address(i + playersNum); // this is how we create the second 100 players with different addresses
}
uint256 gasStartSecond = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * players.length}(players);
uint256 gasEndSecond = gasleft();
uint256 gasUsedSecond = (gasStartSecond - gasEndSecond);
console2.log("Gas Cost of the second 100 players:", gasUsedSecond);
assert(gasUsedSecond > gasUsed);
}
forge test --mt testDoSattack -vv
[⠊] Compiling...
No files changed, compilation skipped
Ran 1 test for test/PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol:PuppyRaffleTest
[PASS] testDoSattack() (gas: 112941986)
Logs:
Gas Cost of the First 100 players: 23971625
Gas Cost of the second 100 players: 88937365
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 25.16ms (24.46ms CPU time)

As you can see, gas cost for the second 100 players (88937365 gas)is much more than the gas cost for the first 100 players(23971625 gas)
The Second 100 players have to pay 3.71 times more gas than the first.

Recommended Mitigation:

  1. Consider allowing duplicates. Users can make multiple wallet addresses anyways

  2. Consider using a mapping to check for duplicates.

+ mapping (address => uint256) public addressToRaffleId;
+ uint256 raffleId = 0;
.
.
.
.
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
- // Check for duplicates
- for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
- for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
- require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
- }
- }
+ // Check for duplicates only from the newPlayers
+ for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
+ require(addressToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] != raffleId, "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player!")
+ }
emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers);
}
.
.
.
function selectWinner() external {
+ raffleId = raffleId + 1;
require(block.timestamp >= raffleStartTime + raffleDuration, "PuppyRaffle: Raffle not over");
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 11 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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