Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

M-1: Unbounded O(n²) duplicate check in enterRaffle() causes DoS

Description

Severity: Medium

The enterRaffle() function at PuppyRaffle.sol:86-90 uses a nested O(n²) loop to check for duplicate players:

for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}

This iterates over ALL existing players for every new entry. With n total players, this requires n*(n-1)/2 comparisons at ~200 gas each:

  • 100 players: ~990,000 gas

  • 500 players: ~24,975,000 gas (approaches block gas limit)

  • 1,000 players: ~99,900,000 gas (exceeds 30M block gas limit)

An attacker can enter with hundreds of unique addresses, making subsequent enterRaffle() calls revert due to exceeding the block gas limit.

Proof of Concept

function testDosEnterRaffle() public {
// Attacker enters with 100 addresses
uint256 attackerCount = 100;
address[] memory attackers = new address[](attackerCount);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < attackerCount; i++) {
attackers[i] = address(uint160(i + 100));
}
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * attackerCount}(attackers);
// Measure gas for a new player entering after 100 existing entries
address[] memory newPlayer = new address[](1);
newPlayer[0] = address(uint160(999));
uint256 gasBefore = gasleft();
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee}(newPlayer);
uint256 gasUsed = gasBefore - gasleft();
// Gas scales quadratically — with 500+ players it exceeds block gas limit
emit log_named_uint("Gas used with 101 players", gasUsed);
}

Risk

  • Impact: Medium — denial of service on enterRaffle(). Prevents new players from joining. Existing funds are not directly lost but the raffle is broken.

  • Likelihood: High — cheap to execute (attacker pays entrance fees recoverable via refund()).

Recommended Mitigation

Replace the O(n²) nested loop at PuppyRaffle.sol:86-90 with an O(1) mapping lookup:

mapping(address => bool) private _isInCurrentRaffle;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
require(!_isInCurrentRaffle[newPlayers[i]], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
_isInCurrentRaffle[newPlayers[i]] = true;
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers);
}

Clear the mapping entries when resetting the raffle in selectWinner().

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 4 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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