O(n²) Duplicate Check Enables Gas DoS on enterRaffle()
Description
Players call enterRaffle() with a list of addresses to join the raffle, paying the entrance fee per address.
The duplicate check iterates over the entire players array with a nested loop on every new entry. An attacker enters a large batch of addresses in one
transaction, causing all subsequent enterRaffle() calls to consume so much gas they exceed the block gas limit and revert permanently.
// @> Nested loop iterates over ALL existing players on every new entry
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
// @> O(n^2) complexity — ~500 players exceeds block gas limit
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
Risk
Likelihood:
A single attacker transaction entering a large batch of unique addresses permanently blocks all future entries for that raffle round.
The attack resets each round when delete players is called, so the attacker must repeat it each round — but the cost is low compared to the damage caused.
Impact:
No new players can enter the raffle after the attack, permanently denying participation to honest users.
The protocol loses all future entrance fee revenue until redeployment.
Proof of Concept
Gas cost grows quadratically with the number of players. The test below demonstrates the growth — at approximately 500 players the gas cost exceeds the Ethereum
block gas limit of 30 million, making all future calls revert:
function test_DoS_QuadraticLoop() public {
uint256[] memory sizes = new uint256;
sizes[0] = 10; sizes[1] = 50; sizes[2] = 100;
for (uint256 s = 0; s bool) private _isEntered;
function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "...");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
require(!_isEntered[newPlayers[i]], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
_isEntered[newPlayers[i]] = true;
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
}
## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```
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