Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

getActivePlayerIndex Returns 0 for Both Index-0 Player and Non-Members, Causing Silent Refund Failures

getActivePlayerIndex Returns 0 for Both Index-0 Player and Non-Members, Causing Silent Refund Failures

Severity: Medium

Description

  • getActivePlayerIndex is the only way for a player to discover their index before calling refund. It returns 0 on both a successful lookup (player is at index

  1. and a failed lookup (player is not enrolled), making it impossible to distinguish the two cases.

  • The off-by-one ambiguity means a player who is not in the raffle will call refund(0), which reverts — but they receive no useful error from the lookup itself,
    so they may keep retrying and never recover their funds through another path.

function getActivePlayerIndex(address player)
external view returns (uint256)
{
@> for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
@> if (players[i] == player) {
@> return i;
@> }
@> }
// falls through — returns 0, same as a real index-0 hit
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Any player at index 0 who needs to verify their enrollment gets back 0, which is indistinguishable from "not found"

  • Any player not in the raffle (e.g. after a refund clears their slot) also gets back 0 and may mistakenly call refund(0)

Impact:

  • Players cannot reliably determine their refund eligibility off-chain

  • Integrating contracts or front-ends that trust the return value will misidentify non-members as index-0 players

  • Calls to refund(0) by non-members will revert, causing confusing UX and wasted gas

Proof of Concept

The test below shows that both address(10) at index 0 and address(99) who never entered return the same value of 0.

function test_M2_AmbiguousActivePlayerIndex() public {
address[] memory players = new address;
players[0] = address(10);
players[1] = address(11);
vm.deal(address(this), entranceFee * 2);
raffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * 2}(players);
uint256 indexOfPlayer0 = raffle.getActivePlayerIndex(address(10));
uint256 indexOfNobody = raffle.getActivePlayerIndex(address(99));
// Both return 0 — caller cannot distinguish enrolled vs not enrolled
assertEq(indexOfPlayer0, 0);
assertEq(indexOfNobody, 0);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Return a sentinel value such as type(uint256).max when the player is not found, so callers can distinguish "not enrolled" from "enrolled at index 0". Update any
documentation or front-end that reads this function.

function getActivePlayerIndex(address player)
external view returns (uint256)
{
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
if (players[i] == player) {
return i;
}
}

  • // implicit return 0

  • return type(uint256).max; // sentinel: player not found
    }

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-01] Ambiguous index returned from PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address), leading to possible refund failures

## Description The `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` returns `0` when the index of this player's address is not found, which is the same as if the player would have been found in the first element in the array. This can trick calling logic to think the address was found and then attempt to execute a `PuppyRaffle::refund(uint256)`. ## Vulnerability Details The `PuppyRaffle::refund()` function requires the index of the player's address to preform the requested refund. ```solidity /// @param playerIndex the index of the player to refund. You can find it externally by calling `getActivePlayerIndex` function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public; ``` In order to have this index, `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` must be used to learn the correct value. ```solidity /// @notice a way to get the index in the array /// @param player the address of a player in the raffle /// @return the index of the player in the array, if they are not active, it returns 0 function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (int256) { // find the index... // if not found, then... return 0; } ``` The logic in this function returns `0` as the default, which is as stated in the `@return` NatSpec. However, this can create an issue when the calling logic checks the value and naturally assumes `0` is a valid index that points to the first element in the array. When the players array has at two or more players, calling `PuppyRaffle::refund()` with the incorrect index will result in a normal revert with the message "PuppyRaffle: Only the player can refund", which is fine and obviously expected. On the other hand, in the event a user attempts to perform a `PuppyRaffle::refund()` before a player has been added the EvmError will likely cause an outrageously large gas fee to be charged to the user. This test case can demonstrate the issue: ```solidity function testRefundWhenIndexIsOutOfBounds() public { int256 playerIndex = puppyRaffle.getActivePlayerIndex(playerOne); vm.prank(playerOne); puppyRaffle.refund(uint256(playerIndex)); } ``` The results of running this one test show about 9 ETH in gas: ```text Running 1 test for test/PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol:PuppyRaffleTest [FAIL. Reason: EvmError: Revert] testRefundWhenIndexIsOutOfBounds() (gas: 9079256848778899449) Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 914.01µs ``` Additionally, in the very unlikely event that the first player to have entered attempts to preform a `PuppyRaffle::refund()` for another user who has not already entered the raffle, they will unwittingly refund their own entry. A scenario whereby this might happen would be if `playerOne` entered the raffle for themselves and 10 friends. Thinking that `nonPlayerEleven` had been included in the original list and has subsequently requested a `PuppyRaffle::refund()`. Accommodating the request, `playerOne` gets the index for `nonPlayerEleven`. Since the address does not exist as a player, `0` is returned to `playerOne` who then calls `PuppyRaffle::refund()`, thereby refunding their own entry. ## Impact 1. Exorbitantly high gas fees charged to user who might inadvertently request a refund before players have entered the raffle. 2. Inadvertent refunds given based in incorrect `playerIndex`. ## Recommendations 1. Ideally, the whole process can be simplified. Since only the `msg.sender` can request a refund for themselves, there is no reason why `PuppyRaffle::refund()` cannot do the entire process in one call. Consider refactoring and implementing the `PuppyRaffle::refund()` function in this manner: ```solidity /// @dev This function will allow there to be blank spots in the array function refund() public { require(_isActivePlayer(), "PuppyRaffle: Player is not active"); address playerAddress = msg.sender; payable(msg.sender).sendValue(entranceFee); for (uint256 playerIndex = 0; playerIndex < players.length; ++playerIndex) { if (players[playerIndex] == playerAddress) { players[playerIndex] = address(0); } } delete existingAddress[playerAddress]; emit RaffleRefunded(playerAddress); } ``` Which happens to take advantage of the existing and currently unused `PuppyRaffle::_isActivePlayer()` and eliminates the need for the index altogether. 2. Alternatively, if the existing process is necessary for the business case, then consider refactoring the `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` function to return something other than a `uint` that could be mistaken for a valid array index. ```diff + int256 public constant INDEX_NOT_FOUND = -1; + function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (int256) { - function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (uint256) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) { if (players[i] == player) { return int256(i); } } - return 0; + return INDEX_NOT_FOUND; } function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public { + require(playerIndex < players.length, "PuppyRaffle: No player for index"); ```

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