Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in selectWinner() leads to overflow and incorrect fee calculation

Title: Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in selectWinner() leads to overflow and incorrect fee calculation
Impact: High — Fee accounting breaks silently, wrong amounts withdrawn.
Likelihood: High — Triggers after ~18 rounds with 1 ETH entrance fee.
Reference Files: src/PuppyRaffle.sol:30,134

Description:

Description

totalFees is declared as uint64 but accumulates uint256 values via an unsafe downcast. In Solidity 0.7.6, this silently truncates and wraps without reverting. The vulnerable code:

uint64 public totalFees = 0;
uint256 fee = (totalAmountCollected * 20) / 100;
totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);

After enough rounds, the accumulated fees exceed type(uint64).max and wrap to a small value.

Risk

Impact: High. withdrawFees() sends the wrong amount because totalFees has wrapped. All fee accounting is corrupted.
Likelihood: High. With 1 ETH entrance fee, overflow occurs after approximately 18 raffle rounds. Inevitable over time.
A contract running 20 raffle rounds will have totalFees wrap to a value far below the actual accumulated fees.

Proof of Concept

function testUint64Overflow() public {
uint64 max = type(uint64).max;
uint64 result = max + uint64(0.8 ether);
assertTrue(result < 0.8 ether, "totalFees wrapped");
}

The accumulator silently wraps — type(uint64).max + 0.8 ether becomes approximately 0.3 ether.

Recommended Mitigation

Change totalFees to uint256 and remove the typecast:

uint256 public totalFees;
totalFees = totalFees + fee;

Matching types prevent silent truncation and wrapping.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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