Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Unsafe uint64 cast on totalFees silently truncates and permanently locks fees

Description

The intended behavior: totalFees should always equal the protocol fees actually held by the contract, so withdrawFees() can pay them out.

The bug: totalFees is a uint64 and is updated with an unchecked cast under Solidity 0.7.6 (no built-in overflow checks). type(uint64).max is only about 18.446 ETH. As soon as a round's fee (20% of the pot) exceeds that, uint64(fee) discards the high bits and totalFees records a wrong, much smaller value. Because withdrawFees() gates on an exact equality, it can then never be satisfied, locking the fees forever.

@> uint64 public totalFees = 0;
...
@> totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); // fee is uint256; cast truncates above 2^64-1
...
function withdrawFees() external {
@> require(address(this).balance == uint256(totalFees), "PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");
...
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium. It triggers once cumulative or single-round fees exceed ~18.45 ETH, which is reachable with a large pot or repeated rounds.

Impact: High. Protocol fees are silently lost from the accounting and the ETH backing them is permanently locked, with no recovery path.

Proof of Concept

Run forge test --match-test test_H3_totalFees_overflow_locks_fees. A 100-ETH pot produces a real fee of 20 ETH. After selectWinner(), the contract holds 20 ETH but totalFees reads 1,553,255,926,290,448,384 wei (~1.553 ETH). The difference, 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 wei (exactly 2^64), is lost, and withdrawFees() reverts with "There are currently players active!".

function test_H3_totalFees_overflow_locks_fees() public {
// 100 ETH pot => fee = 20 ETH, which exceeds type(uint64).max (~18.45 ETH)
_enterManyPlayers(100);
uint256 realFee = (100 ether * 20) / 100; // 20 ETH
vm.warp(raffle.raffleStartTime() + duration + 1);
raffle.selectWinner();
uint256 recorded = raffle.totalFees();
assertEq(recorded, uint256(uint64(realFee))); // truncated value
assertLt(recorded, realFee); // ~18.45 ETH silently lost
// The 20 ETH held can never be withdrawn: balance != totalFees
vm.expectRevert("PuppyRaffle: There are currently players active!");
raffle.withdrawFees();
}

Recommended Mitigation

Store totalFees as uint256 and remove the cast. Do not gate withdrawFees() on address(this).balance == totalFees; track owed fees explicitly and transfer that amount.

- uint64 public totalFees = 0;
+ uint256 public totalFees = 0;
...
- totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee);
+ totalFees = totalFees + fee;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-05] Typecasting from uint256 to uint64 in PuppyRaffle.selectWinner() May Lead to Overflow and Incorrect Fee Calculation

## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.

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