Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

# `getActivePlayerIndex` returns `0` for a non-existent player, colliding with the first valid index

getActivePlayerIndex returns 0 for a non-existent player, colliding with the first valid index

Severity: Low

Description

  • getActivePlayerIndex is meant to tell a caller their position in players so they can pass it to refund.

  • It returns 0 when the player is not found, but 0 is also the legitimate index of the first player, so the two cases are indistinguishable.

function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (uint256) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
if (players[i] == player) {
return i;
}
}
@> return 0; // same value as "player is at index 0"
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Occurs for every lookup of an address that is not in the raffle, and for the player who genuinely sits at index 0.

Impact:

  • The first player may conclude they are not active and never refund; integrators relying on the return value may act on the wrong index. No direct loss of funds, but a real correctness/UX defect.

Proof of Concept

Save as test/IndexAmbiguityPoC.t.sol and run forge test --mt testIndexZeroIsAmbiguous. The player at index 0 and an address that never entered both return 0.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.7.6;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;
import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {PuppyRaffle} from "../src/PuppyRaffle.sol";
contract IndexAmbiguityPoC is Test {
PuppyRaffle puppyRaffle;
uint256 entranceFee = 1e18;
function setUp() public {
puppyRaffle = new PuppyRaffle(entranceFee, address(99), 1 days);
}
function testIndexZeroIsAmbiguous() public {
address[] memory players = new address[](1);
players[0] = address(1);
puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee}(players);
// address(1) is genuinely at index 0
assertEq(puppyRaffle.getActivePlayerIndex(address(1)), 0);
// an address that never entered also returns 0 — indistinguishable
assertEq(puppyRaffle.getActivePlayerIndex(address(0xdead)), 0);
}
}

Recommended Mitigation

Revert when the player is not found, or return an unambiguous sentinel such as type(uint256).max.

function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (uint256) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) {
if (players[i] == player) {
return i;
}
}
- return 0;
+ revert("PuppyRaffle: player is not active");
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-01] Ambiguous index returned from PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address), leading to possible refund failures

## Description The `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` returns `0` when the index of this player's address is not found, which is the same as if the player would have been found in the first element in the array. This can trick calling logic to think the address was found and then attempt to execute a `PuppyRaffle::refund(uint256)`. ## Vulnerability Details The `PuppyRaffle::refund()` function requires the index of the player's address to preform the requested refund. ```solidity /// @param playerIndex the index of the player to refund. You can find it externally by calling `getActivePlayerIndex` function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public; ``` In order to have this index, `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` must be used to learn the correct value. ```solidity /// @notice a way to get the index in the array /// @param player the address of a player in the raffle /// @return the index of the player in the array, if they are not active, it returns 0 function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (int256) { // find the index... // if not found, then... return 0; } ``` The logic in this function returns `0` as the default, which is as stated in the `@return` NatSpec. However, this can create an issue when the calling logic checks the value and naturally assumes `0` is a valid index that points to the first element in the array. When the players array has at two or more players, calling `PuppyRaffle::refund()` with the incorrect index will result in a normal revert with the message "PuppyRaffle: Only the player can refund", which is fine and obviously expected. On the other hand, in the event a user attempts to perform a `PuppyRaffle::refund()` before a player has been added the EvmError will likely cause an outrageously large gas fee to be charged to the user. This test case can demonstrate the issue: ```solidity function testRefundWhenIndexIsOutOfBounds() public { int256 playerIndex = puppyRaffle.getActivePlayerIndex(playerOne); vm.prank(playerOne); puppyRaffle.refund(uint256(playerIndex)); } ``` The results of running this one test show about 9 ETH in gas: ```text Running 1 test for test/PuppyRaffleTest.t.sol:PuppyRaffleTest [FAIL. Reason: EvmError: Revert] testRefundWhenIndexIsOutOfBounds() (gas: 9079256848778899449) Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 914.01µs ``` Additionally, in the very unlikely event that the first player to have entered attempts to preform a `PuppyRaffle::refund()` for another user who has not already entered the raffle, they will unwittingly refund their own entry. A scenario whereby this might happen would be if `playerOne` entered the raffle for themselves and 10 friends. Thinking that `nonPlayerEleven` had been included in the original list and has subsequently requested a `PuppyRaffle::refund()`. Accommodating the request, `playerOne` gets the index for `nonPlayerEleven`. Since the address does not exist as a player, `0` is returned to `playerOne` who then calls `PuppyRaffle::refund()`, thereby refunding their own entry. ## Impact 1. Exorbitantly high gas fees charged to user who might inadvertently request a refund before players have entered the raffle. 2. Inadvertent refunds given based in incorrect `playerIndex`. ## Recommendations 1. Ideally, the whole process can be simplified. Since only the `msg.sender` can request a refund for themselves, there is no reason why `PuppyRaffle::refund()` cannot do the entire process in one call. Consider refactoring and implementing the `PuppyRaffle::refund()` function in this manner: ```solidity /// @dev This function will allow there to be blank spots in the array function refund() public { require(_isActivePlayer(), "PuppyRaffle: Player is not active"); address playerAddress = msg.sender; payable(msg.sender).sendValue(entranceFee); for (uint256 playerIndex = 0; playerIndex < players.length; ++playerIndex) { if (players[playerIndex] == playerAddress) { players[playerIndex] = address(0); } } delete existingAddress[playerAddress]; emit RaffleRefunded(playerAddress); } ``` Which happens to take advantage of the existing and currently unused `PuppyRaffle::_isActivePlayer()` and eliminates the need for the index altogether. 2. Alternatively, if the existing process is necessary for the business case, then consider refactoring the `PuppyRaffle::getActivePlayerIndex(address)` function to return something other than a `uint` that could be mistaken for a valid array index. ```diff + int256 public constant INDEX_NOT_FOUND = -1; + function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (int256) { - function getActivePlayerIndex(address player) external view returns (uint256) { for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length; i++) { if (players[i] == player) { return int256(i); } } - return 0; + return INDEX_NOT_FOUND; } function refund(uint256 playerIndex) public { + require(playerIndex < players.length, "PuppyRaffle: No player for index"); ```

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