Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Quadratic duplicate check in enterRaffle() allows permanent DoS by filling the player array

Root Cause

enterRaffle() runs a quadratic duplicate check over the whole players array:

@ (uint256 i = 0; i + 1 < players.length; i++) {
@ (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
@ != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");

The array only grows - refund leaves holes, it never shrinks - so the gas cost of entering grows quadratically with the number of players.

Description

Measured gas with forge: 100 players = 6.5M gas, 300 players = 73.6M gas (11x for 3x players - quadratic growth). An attacker fills the array with cheap addresses; beyond ~400-600 players, enterRaffle() exceeds the block gas limit and nobody can ever enter again. Since the raffle cannot end without selectWinner() and the array cannot shrink, this is a permanent DoS.

Risk

Reason 1: O(n2) duplicate check on an unbounded array.
Reason 2: array length never decreases (refund leaves holes).

Impact 1: permanent DoS - no one can enter the raffle anymore.
Impact 2: attacker griefs the protocol for the cost of a few hundred entrance fees.

Proof of Concept

forge test --match-test test_BUG4_quadraticGasDoS -vvv

Gas measurements:
100 players: 6,523,109 gas
300 players: 73,666,638 gas

3x players - 11x gas: quadratic growth confirmed. The block gas limit is exceeded between 400 and 600 players.

Recommended Mitigation

Replace the O(n2) nested-loop duplicate check with a mapping (mapping(address =< bool) isPlayer) for O(1) duplicate detection, or bound the maximum number of players in the raffle.

Extended Impact

Because refund() leaves holes instead of compacting, the players array grows monotonically: every new player makes the next enterRaffle() call more expensive, and no operation ever reduces the array size (selectWinner() resets it, but only after 30 days and it can be blocked by the holes bug). This means the DoS is permanent once the gas threshold is crossed - there is no recovery path other than ending the raffle early. The griefing cost is bounded by the entrance fee times the number of addresses used (cheap EOAs), while the damage is unbounded: the protocol and all players are locked out of the raffle forever. An attacker can also time the attack right after a large legitimate influx of players, crossing the threshold with a relatively small additional cost.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 1 day ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!