Puppy Raffle

AI First Flight #1
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Quadratic duplicate checking makes new entries eventually unavailable

Root + Impact

Description

After appending each batch, enterRaffle() scans every pair in the complete players array to find duplicates. For N active entries this executes N(N-1)/2 comparisons on every successful call. The marginal cost therefore grows quadratically with the round size until valid new entries no longer fit within a practical transaction gas limit.

function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable {
require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle");
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
players.push(newPlayers[i]);
}
​
// @> Rechecks every pair in the full historical round after each append.
for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) {
for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) {
require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
}
}
}

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

The issue is reached naturally as a popular round grows, or intentionally by a funded participant supplying many distinct addresses. Each persistent growth step costs the required entry capital, and the precise failure threshold depends on chain gas limits and configuration, so no universal participant count is claimed.

Impact: Medium

Valid users can eventually be unable to enter the current round, breaking raffle availability and preventing further deposits. A successful settlement clears players, so the degradation does not automatically carry into the next round.

Proof of Concept

The following test compares fresh raffles with 10 and 100 unique entrants and asserts that the larger call uses more than 15 times the gas:

function testPoC_DuplicateCheckGasGrowsQuadratically() public {
PuppyRaffle small = new PuppyRaffle(1 wei, FEE_ADDRESS, DURATION);
PuppyRaffle large = new PuppyRaffle(1 wei, FEE_ADDRESS, DURATION);
​
uint256 gasBefore = gasleft();
_enter(small, 10, 1_000, 1 wei);
uint256 smallGas = gasBefore - gasleft();
​
gasBefore = gasleft();
_enter(large, 100, 2_000, 1 wei);
uint256 largeGas = gasBefore - gasleft();
​
assertGt(largeGas, smallGas * 15, "quadratic scan should grow super-linearly");
}

Observed against challenge commit 08e5b1fc6939b8da7792b2d13e43000c519d8897:

[PASS] testPoC_DuplicateCheckGasGrowsQuadratically() (gas: 6904537)

6904537 is the total Foundry gas reported for the complete test, not either individual measurement. The passing assertion proves largeGas > smallGas * 15; it does not establish a universal network failure threshold.

Recommended Mitigation

Track membership in constant time with a mapping scoped by round and address. Set the mark before appending, clear it when that player is refunded, and increment roundId after settlement so old marks require no iteration or deletion.

+ uint256 public roundId;
+ mapping(uint256 => mapping(address => bool)) private enteredByRound;
​
for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) {
- players.push(newPlayers[i]);
+ address player = newPlayers[i];
+ require(!enteredByRound[roundId][player], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player");
+ enteredByRound[roundId][player] = true;
+ players.push(player);
}
- // remove both nested loops

Regression tests should preserve duplicate rejection within one batch and across calls, allow re-entry after a completed refund, allow prior-round addresses after roundId advances, and compare marginal gas at representative round sizes.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] `PuppyRaffle: enterRaffle` Use of gas extensive duplicate check leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than prev ones to enter

## Description `enterRaffle` function uses gas inefficient duplicate check that causes leads to Denial of Service, making subsequent participants to spend much more gas than previous users to enter. ## Vulnerability Details In the `enterRaffle` function, to check duplicates, it loops through the `players` array. As the `player` array grows, it will make more checks, which leads the later user to pay more gas than the earlier one. More users in the Raffle, more checks a user have to make leads to pay more gas. ## Impact As the arrays grows significantly over time, it will make the function unusable due to block gas limit. This is not a fair approach and lead to bad user experience. ## POC In existing test suit, add this test to see the difference b/w gas for users. once added run `forge test --match-test testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient -vvvvv` in terminal. you will be able to see logs in terminal. ```solidity function testEnterRaffleIsGasInefficient() public { vm.startPrank(owner); vm.txGasPrice(1); /// First we enter 100 participants uint256 firstBatch = 100; address[] memory firstBatchPlayers = new address[](firstBatch); for(uint256 i = 0; i < firstBatchPlayers; i++) { firstBatch[i] = address(i); } uint256 gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * firstBatch}(firstBatchPlayers); uint256 gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForFirstBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the first 100 partipants is:", gasUsedForFirstBatch); /// Now we enter 100 more participants uint256 secondBatch = 200; address[] memory secondBatchPlayers = new address[](secondBatch); for(uint256 i = 100; i < secondBatchPlayers; i++) { secondBatch[i] = address(i); } gasStart = gasleft(); puppyRaffle.enterRaffle{value: entranceFee * secondBatch}(secondBatchPlayers); gasEnd = gasleft(); uint256 gasUsedForSecondBatch = (gasStart - gasEnd) * txPrice; console.log("Gas cost of the next 100 participant is:", gasUsedForSecondBatch); vm.stopPrank(owner); } ``` ## Recommendations Here are some of recommendations, any one of that can be used to mitigate this risk. 1. User a mapping to check duplicates. For this approach you to declare a variable `uint256 raffleID`, that way each raffle will have unique id. Add a mapping from player address to raffle id to keep of users for particular round. ```diff + uint256 public raffleID; + mapping (address => uint256) public usersToRaffleId; . . function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); + usersToRaffleId[newPlayers[i]] = true; } // Check for duplicates + for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++){ + require(usersToRaffleId[i] != raffleID, "PuppyRaffle: Already a participant"); - for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { - for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { - require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); - } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } . . . function selectWinner() external { //Existing code + raffleID = raffleID + 1; } ``` 2. Allow duplicates participants, As technically you can't stop people participants more than once. As players can use new address to enter. ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { players.push(newPlayers[i]); } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```

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