Drawing a winner should always succeed once the time has passed and enough players entered.
selectWinner pushes the prize with call and then uses _safeMint. If the chosen winner is a contract that cannot receive ETH, or that does not implement onERC721Received, the whole transaction reverts. Smart-contract wallets and other contracts are allowed to enter.
Attack / failure path:
Several players enter through smart-contract wallets or contracts without a payable receive() (or without onERC721Received).
selectWinner picks one of them; the call returns false (or _safeMint reverts in the ERC721 receiver check).
The whole transaction reverts, players is not cleared and raffleStartTime is not reset.
Callers must keep retrying with other msg.sender / timestamps hoping for a different index; if all or most entrants are such contracts the round can never finish and their ETH stays locked.
Likelihood:
Needs a contract player without receive / onERC721Received among the entrants. If many players are such contracts the draw fails repeatedly.
Impact:
The round cannot finish until a caller happens to get a different winner index; with enough such players the raffle is stuck and funds are locked, and new rounds cannot start.
All tests run in a test contract that deploys PuppyRaffle(1e18, address(99), 1 days) and uses the helpers _players(start,n) (distinct addresses) and _enter(p) (pays 1e18 * p.length). Full file: test/AuditPoC.t.sol, forge test --mc AuditPoC passes.
Pay the winner with a pull pattern so a bad recipient cannot block the draw:
## Description If a player submits a smart contract as a player, and if it doesn't implement the `receive()` or `fallback()` function, the call use to send the funds to the winner will fail to execute, compromising the functionality of the protocol. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability comes from the way that are programmed smart contracts, if the smart contract doesn't implement a `receive() payable` or `fallback() payable` functions, it is not possible to send ether to the program. ## Impact High - Medium: The protocol won't be able to select a winner but players will be able to withdraw funds with the `refund()` function ## Recommendations Restrict access to the raffle to only EOAs (Externally Owned Accounts), by checking if the passed address in enterRaffle is a smart contract, if it is we revert the transaction. We can easily implement this check into the function because of the Adress library from OppenZeppelin. I'll add this replace `enterRaffle()` with these lines of code: ```solidity function enterRaffle(address[] memory newPlayers) public payable { require(msg.value == entranceFee * newPlayers.length, "PuppyRaffle: Must send enough to enter raffle"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < newPlayers.length; i++) { require(Address.isContract(newPlayers[i]) == false, "The players need to be EOAs"); players.push(newPlayers[i]); } // Check for duplicates for (uint256 i = 0; i < players.length - 1; i++) { for (uint256 j = i + 1; j < players.length; j++) { require(players[i] != players[j], "PuppyRaffle: Duplicate player"); } } emit RaffleEnter(newPlayers); } ```
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