totalFees is declared as uint64, and each draw adds the new fee with an explicit narrowing cast: totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee). The contract uses Solidity 0.7.6, which has no built-in overflow checks. Once a single fee (or the accumulated total) exceeds type(uint64).max (about 18.44 ETH in wei), the value silently wraps around, so totalFees no longer equals the fees actually owed. The feeAddress then withdraws far less than owed, and the leftover ETH stays stuck in the contract (it also breaks the withdrawFees balance-equality invariant, compounding Finding 3).
Likelihood: Low - a single round needs a fee above ~18.44 ETH (for example 4 players at a 100 ETH entrance fee, or many high-value rounds accumulating), which is beyond the expected puppy-raffle scale but fully possible for a reusable deployment.
Impact: Medium - fee accounting is corrupted silently and permanently; the protocol loses the difference and the excess ETH cannot be recovered through any function.
Verified with Foundry (test passes): with an entrance fee of 100 ETH and 4 players, the true fee is 80 ETH, but totalFees stores only the truncated uint64 value (about 6.21 ETH).
Store fees in uint256 and drop the narrowing cast:
## Description ## Vulnerability Details The type conversion from uint256 to uint64 in the expression 'totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee)' may potentially cause overflow problems if the 'fee' exceeds the maximum value that a uint64 can accommodate (2^64 - 1). ```javascript totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); ``` ## POC <details> <summary>Code</summary> ```javascript function testOverflow() public { uint256 initialBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // This value is greater than the maximum value a uint64 can hold uint256 fee = 2**64; // Send ether to the contract (bool success, ) = address(puppyRaffle).call{value: fee}(""); assertTrue(success); uint256 finalBalance = address(puppyRaffle).balance; // Check if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee); } ``` </details> In this test, assertTrue(success) checks if the ether was successfully sent to the contract, and assertEq(finalBalance, initialBalance + fee) checks if the contract's balance increased by the expected amount. If the balance didn't increase as expected, it could indicate an overflow. ## Impact This could consequently lead to inaccuracies in the computation of 'totalFees'. ## Recommendations To resolve this issue, you should change the data type of `totalFees` from `uint64` to `uint256`. This will prevent any potential overflow issues, as `uint256` can accommodate much larger numbers than `uint64`. Here's how you can do it: Change the declaration of `totalFees` from: ```javascript uint64 public totalFees = 0; ``` to: ```jasvascript uint256 public totalFees = 0; ``` And update the line where `totalFees` is updated from: ```diff - totalFees = totalFees + uint64(fee); + totalFees = totalFees + fee; ``` This way, you ensure that the data types are consistent and can handle the range of values that your contract may encounter.
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