Rust Fund

AI First Flight #9
Beginner FriendlyRust
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Unsafe Lamports Manipulation

Summary

The refund function in the provided code directly manipulates the lamports of accounts using try_borrow_mut_lamports(). This approach bypasses the Solana runtime's safety checks, leading to potential security vulnerabilities and program instability.

https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-rustfund/blob/b5dd7b0ec01471667ae3a02520701aae405ac857/programs/rustfund/src/lib.rs#L68-70

This method of direct lamport manipulation can lead to several issues:

  1. Bypassing Rent Exemption Checks: Accounts in Solana must maintain a minimum balance to be rent-exempt. Directly reducing an account's lamports without verifying rent exemption can result in the account being marked for deletion by the Solana runtime.

  2. Ownership Constraints: Only the owning program of an account can modify its data and lamport balance. Direct manipulation without proper checks can violate these constraints, leading to program errors.

  3. Lack of Atomicity: Direct lamport transfers lack the atomic transaction guarantees provided by the system program's transfer instruction, potentially leading to inconsistent states in case of program interruptions.

Impact

Exploiting this vulnerability can result in unauthorized fund transfers, violation of Solana's account ownership rules, and potential loss of funds due to accounts becoming non-rent-exempt.

Tools Used

Code analysis and Solana's official documentation.

Proof of Concept

Recommended Mitigation

let cpi_context = CpiContext::new(
ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(),
system_program::Transfer {
from: ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info(),
to: ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info(),
},
);
system_program::transfer(cpi_context, amount)?;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 5 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-03] Unsafe Direct Lamport Manipulation in refund(), withdraw() Functions

## Description The `refund` function in the provided code directly manipulates the lamports of accounts using `try_borrow_mut_lamports()`. This approach bypasses the Solana runtime's safety checks, leading to potential security vulnerabilities and program instability. ## Vulnerability Details In the `refund` function, lamports are transferred between accounts by directly adjusting their balances:   ```Rust **ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? = ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().lamports().checked_sub(amount).ok_or(ProgramError::InsufficientFunds)?; **ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? = ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().lamports().checked_add(amount).ok_or(ErrorCode::CalculationOverflow)?; ``` This method of direct lamport manipulation can lead to several issues: 1. **Bypassing Rent Exemption Checks:** Accounts in Solana must maintain a minimum balance to be rent-exempt. Directly reducing an account's lamports without verifying rent exemption can result in the account being marked for deletion by the Solana runtime. 2. **Ownership Constraints:** Only the owning program of an account can modify its data and lamport balance. Direct manipulation without proper checks can violate these constraints, leading to program errors. 3. **Lack of Atomicity:** Direct lamport transfers lack the atomic transaction guarantees provided by the system program's transfer instruction, potentially leading to inconsistent states in case of program interruptions. ## Impact Exploiting this vulnerability can result in unauthorized fund transfers, violation of Solana's account ownership rules, and potential loss of funds due to accounts becoming non-rent-exempt. ## Recommendations Replace the direct lamport manipulation with Solana's system program transfer instruction to ensure safe and compliant fund transfers in refund() & withdraw() functions:   ```Rust let cpi_context = CpiContext::new( ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(), system_program::Transfer { from: ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info(), to: ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info(), }, ); system_program::transfer(cpi_context, amount)?; ``` This approach leverages Solana's native mechanisms for transferring lamports, ensuring adherence to the platform's safety and security protocols.

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