Rust Fund

AI First Flight #9
Beginner FriendlyRust
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Potential Account Closure due to Rent Underflow (Rent Exemption)

Root + Impact

Description

  • Withdraw and refund directly change lamports to exchange. If reamining of fund account is lower than Rent-exempt, account will be deleted by runtime.

let amount = ctx.accounts.fund.amount_raised;
**ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =
ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().lamports()
.checked_sub(amount) // <--- If reammaining is lower than Rent-exempt
.ok_or(ProgramError::InsufficientFunds)?;

Risk

Likelihood:

Impact:

  • Data loss: all project's information will be deleted on blockchain

  • Logical error: all functions access to fund account will be meet the Error "Account does not exist", cause Denial-of-Services

Proof of Concept

let amount = ctx.accounts.fund.amount_raised;
**ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =
ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().lamports()
.checked_sub(amount)
.ok_or(ProgramError::InsufficientFunds)?;

Recommended Mitigation

pub fn withdraw(ctx: Context<FundWithdraw>) -> Result<()> {
let fund_info = ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info();
let rent_amount = Rent::get()?.minimum_balance(fund_info.data_len());
let current_balance = fund_info.lamports();
+ add this code
let withdrawable_amount = current_balance.checked_sub(rent_amount).unwrap_or(0);
let amount_to_withdraw = std::cmp::min(ctx.accounts.fund.amount_raised, withdrawable_amount);
​
**fund_info.try_borrow_mut_lamports()? -= amount_to_withdraw;
**ctx.accounts.creator.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? += amount_to_withdraw;
​
Ok(())
}
​
​
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 13 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[L-03] Unsafe Direct Lamport Manipulation in refund(), withdraw() Functions

## Description The `refund` function in the provided code directly manipulates the lamports of accounts using `try_borrow_mut_lamports()`. This approach bypasses the Solana runtime's safety checks, leading to potential security vulnerabilities and program instability. ## Vulnerability Details In the `refund` function, lamports are transferred between accounts by directly adjusting their balances: &#x20; ```Rust **ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? = ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().lamports().checked_sub(amount).ok_or(ProgramError::InsufficientFunds)?; **ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? = ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().lamports().checked_add(amount).ok_or(ErrorCode::CalculationOverflow)?; ``` This method of direct lamport manipulation can lead to several issues: 1. **Bypassing Rent Exemption Checks:** Accounts in Solana must maintain a minimum balance to be rent-exempt. Directly reducing an account's lamports without verifying rent exemption can result in the account being marked for deletion by the Solana runtime. 2. **Ownership Constraints:** Only the owning program of an account can modify its data and lamport balance. Direct manipulation without proper checks can violate these constraints, leading to program errors. 3. **Lack of Atomicity:** Direct lamport transfers lack the atomic transaction guarantees provided by the system program's transfer instruction, potentially leading to inconsistent states in case of program interruptions. ## Impact Exploiting this vulnerability can result in unauthorized fund transfers, violation of Solana's account ownership rules, and potential loss of funds due to accounts becoming non-rent-exempt. ## Recommendations Replace the direct lamport manipulation with Solana's system program transfer instruction to ensure safe and compliant fund transfers in refund() & withdraw() functions: &#x20; ```Rust let cpi_context = CpiContext::new( ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(), system_program::Transfer { from: ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info(), to: ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info(), }, ); system_program::transfer(cpi_context, amount)?; ``` This approach leverages Solana's native mechanisms for transferring lamports, ensuring adherence to the platform's safety and security protocols.

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!