Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Arbitrary NFT Transfer Enables DOS on Legitimate Users

Root + Impact

Description

  • The collectPresent function checks if the caller already has an NFT using balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0. However, this check doesn't verify that the NFT was received through legitimate collection.

  • An attacker can transfer or mint NFTs to victims before Christmas, permanently blocking them from collecting their rightful rewards. This creates a griefing vector where malicious actors can deny service to any user on the NICE or EXTRA_NICE list.

// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
@> if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
@> revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); // Reverts if user has ANY NFT
}
// ... rest of function
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • Reason 1 // Any user can transfer NFTs to any address

  • Reason 2 // Attacker can identify NICE/EXTRA_NICE users via CheckedOnce/CheckedTwice events

  • Reason 3 // Attack can be executed before Christmas when victims cannot defend

Impact: Medium

  • Legitimate users permanently locked out of rewards

  • EXTRA_NICE users lose both NFT and 1e18 SantaTokens

  • No recovery mechanism exists

  • Can be monetized through extortion

Proof of Concept

The following test demonstrates how an attacker can block a legitimate EXTRA_NICE user from collecting their rewards by transferring them an NFT before Christmas.

function test_DOSviaTransfer() public {
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
address victim = makeAddr("victim");
// Santa marks victim as EXTRA_NICE
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(victim, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(victim, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
// Attacker gets their own NFT first
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(attacker, SantasList.Status.NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(attacker, SantasList.Status.NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
// Attacker collects their NFT
vm.prank(attacker);
santasList.collectPresent();
// Attacker transfers NFT to victim BEFORE victim collects
vm.prank(attacker);
santasList.transferFrom(attacker, victim, 0);
// Victim now has balanceOf > 0
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(victim), 1);
// Victim tries to collect their legitimate reward
vm.prank(victim);
vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__AlreadyCollected.selector);
santasList.collectPresent();
// Victim permanently locked out - loses NFT AND 1e18 SantaTokens
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(victim), 0);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Track collection status separately from NFT balance using a mapping. This ensures users can only collect once while preventing the transfer-based DOS attack.

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_hasCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_hasCollected[msg.sender] = true;
// ... rest of function
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 20 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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