Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

By default user status is `NICE` (unchecked addresses can claim presents)

[H-2] By default user status is NICE (unchecked addresses can claim presents)

Description

The Status enum starts with NICE as index 0. Uninitialized mapping(address => Status) defaults to Status(0) = NICE. Thus, any address Santa never checked has both s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice set to NICE, making them eligible for collectPresent() after Christmas.

enum Status {
NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Always occurs for any address Santa never explicitly calls checkList/checkTwice on

  • Immediately exploitable after block.timestamp >= CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME

  • Mass exploitation possible - every unchecked address qualifies

Impact:

  • Free NFT minting for unlimited addresses (subject to gas costs)

  • Complete business logic failure - violates "only nice list gets presents"

  • Santa's authority bypassed - no interaction required

Proof of Concept

function test_UncheckedAddressCanClaimNFT() public {
address uncheckedUser = makeAddr("freshUser");
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.startPrank(uncheckedUser);
santasList.collectPresent(); // ✅ Succeeds!
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(uint256(santasList.getNaughtyOrNiceOnce(uncheckedUser)), 0);
assertEq(uint256(santasList.getNaughtyOrNiceTwice(uncheckedUser)), 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(uncheckedUser), 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

- enum Status {
- NICE,
- EXTRA_NICE,
- NAUGHTY,
- NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
- }
+ enum Status {
+ UNKNOWN,
+ NICE,
+ EXTRA_NICE,
+ NAUGHTY
+ }
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 16 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!