Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
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EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Default enum value `NICE = 0` lets unchecked addresses collect presents

Default enum value NICE = 0 lets unchecked addresses collect presents

Description

  • Status.NICE is enum value 0, which is the Solidity default for uninitialized mappings.

  • Any address never checked by Santa has both s_theListCheckedOnce and s_theListCheckedTwice default to NICE, passing all guards in collectPresent.

@> enum Status {
NICE,
EXTRA_NICE,
NAUGHTY,
NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Reason 1 - In Solidity, uninitialized mapping values are 0. Since NICE = 0, every address Santa never checked is implicitly NICE.

Impact:

  • Impact 1 - Any address can collect the present since the default enum value which is 0 set to NICE.

Proof of Concept

  • Paste the code snippet in the SantaListTest.t.sol and run the command forge test --mt test_POC_RandomAddressCollectsPresent -vvvv

function test_POC_RandomAddressCollectsPresent() public {
address randomUser = makeAddr("randomUser");
// Santa NEVER checked this user. Both mappings default to NICE (0).
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.prank(randomUser);
santasList.collectPresent(); // Succeeds — default NICE passes both guards
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(randomUser), 1); // Free NFT for anyone
}

Recommended Mitigation

  • First enum value should be set to NOT_CHECKED instead of NICE.

- enum Status {
- NICE,
- EXTRA_NICE,
- NAUGHTY,
- NOT_CHECKED_TWICE
- }
+ enum Status {
+ NOT_CHECKED,
+ NICE,
+ EXTRA_NICE,
+ NAUGHTY
+ }
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 4 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-02] All addresses are considered `NICE` by default and are able to claim a NFT through `collectPresent` function before any Santa check.

## Description `collectPresent` function is supposed to be called by users that are considered `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` by Santa. This means Santa is supposed to call `checkList` function to assigned a user to a status, and then call `checkTwice` function to execute a double check of the status. Currently, the enum `Status` assigns its default value (0) to `NICE`. This means that both mappings `s_theListCheckedOnce` and `s_theListCheckedTwice` consider every existent address as `NICE`. In other words, all users are by default double checked as `NICE`, and therefore eligible to call `collectPresent` function. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability arises due to the order of elements in the enum. If the first value is `NICE`, this means the enum value for each key in both mappings will be `NICE`, as it corresponds to `0` value. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it results in a flawed mechanism of the present distribution. Any unchecked address is currently able to call `collectPresent` function and mint an NFT. This is because this contract considers by default every address with a `NICE` status (or 0 value). ## Proof of Concept The following Foundry test will show that any user is able to call `collectPresent` function after `CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations I suggest to modify `Status` enum, and use `UNKNOWN` status as the first one. This way, all users will default to `UNKNOWN` status, preventing the successful call to `collectPresent` before any check form Santa: ``` enum Status { UNKNOWN, NICE, EXTRA_NICE, NAUGHTY } ``` After modifying the enum, you can run the following test and see that `collectPresent` call will revert if Santa didn't check the address and assigned its status to `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` : ``` function testCollectPresentIsFlawed() external { // prank an attacker's address vm.startPrank(makeAddr("attacker")); // set block.timestamp to CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME vm.warp(1_703_480_381); // collect present without any check from Santa vm.expectRevert(SantasList.SantasList__NotNice.selector); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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