Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[M-3] collectPresent re-entrancy bypass via NFT transfer allows unlimited collection

Root + Impact

Description

  • collectPresent prevents double-collection by checking if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0). The assumption is that once a user holds the minted NFT their balance stays above zero, blocking future calls.

  • However, ERC721 tokens are freely transferable. After collecting their present, a user can transfer the NFT to another wallet, dropping their balance back to 0. They can then call collectPresent again, minting a second NFT and repeat indefinitely as long as they keep transferring the token away.

function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
// @> Balance-based guard is bypassable — NFT can be transferred away to reset it
if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {
_mintAndIncrement();
return;
}
// ...
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Any NICE or EXTRA_NICE address can transfer their NFT to a second wallet after collection and call collectPresent again

  • A single eligible address can mint unlimited NFTs by repeatedly transferring and re-collecting

Impact:

  • NFTs can be minted without being bound by a single eligible user

  • EXTRA_NICE users also receive unlimited SantaTokens via repeated collection

  • Protocol supply caps are bypassed, and both the NFT and token economies collapse

Proof of Concept

A NICE user collects their present, transfers the NFT away to reset their balance to 0, then calls collectPresent again from the same address, which succeeds because the balance check is now bypassed.

function testDoubleCollectViaTransfer() public {
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.prank(user);
santasList.collectPresent(); // first collection — tokenId 0
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
vm.prank(user);
santasList.transferFrom(user, makeAddr("burner"), 0); // transfer away
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 0);
vm.prank(user);
santasList.collectPresent(); // second collection — succeeds
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(user), 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Track collection eligibility with a dedicated boolean mapping rather than relying on the transferable NFT balance. Once an address collects, mark it permanently regardless of what happens to the token afterward.

+ mapping(address => bool) private s_alreadyCollected;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
+ if (s_alreadyCollected[msg.sender]) {
revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
}
+ s_alreadyCollected[msg.sender] = true;
// ... rest of function unchanged
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 4 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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