Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

[H-2] EXTRA_NICE users can mint unlimited santaToken

Root + Impact

Description

  • The protocol allows EXTRA_NICE users to repeatedly call collectPresent and mint santaToken without any per-user redemption limit. The root cause is the absence of accounting that tracks whether a user has already redeemed their entitled reward. Instead, redemption is implicitly tied to NFT ownership and token IDs, which can be manipulated through transfers.


  • An EXTRA_NICE user can repeatedly claim presents, transfer the NFT to another address, and call collectPresent again to mint additional tokens. This effectively converts NFT transfers into a minting primitive, enabling unbounded token inflation by a single privileged user. The provided POC shows a linear loop where the user repeatedly mints and transfers NFTs, accumulating santaToken with no upper bound.


  • This breaks the token’s scarcity model and invalidates any economic assumptions made in the README. Even if EXTRA_NICE status is intended to be rare, the damage from a single compromised or malicious EXTRA_NICE account is catastrophic. The bug is purely logical and cannot be mitigated off-chain.

if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) {

Risk

Likelihood:

  • High. Once a user is EXTRA_NICE, exploitation is straightforward and permissionless.

Impact:

  • High. Unlimited minting leads to total token supply inflation and economic collapse.

Proof of Concept

Please add this POC on the test file

function testExtraNiceUserCanMintUnlimitedToken() public {
vm.startPrank(santa);
santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE);
vm.stopPrank();
vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME() + 1);
vm.startPrank(user);
address user3 = makeAddr("address3");
address user4 = makeAddr("address4");
address user5 = makeAddr("address5");
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(user,user2,0);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(user,user3,1);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(user,user4,2);
santasList.collectPresent();
santasList.safeTransferFrom(user,user5,3);
santasList.collectPresent();
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 5e18);
}

Recommended Mitigation

add mapping for the redeemed user

+ mapping(address => uint256) public userAlreadyRedeemed;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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