Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

`buyPresent()` charges only `1e18` SantaToken even though the configured purchase cost is `2e18`

Root: the contract defines PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18, but buyPresent() calls SantaToken.burn() which always burns only 1e18. Impact: presents can be bought for half of the configured price, creating an economic and specification mismatch.

Description

  • The intended behavior is that buying a present should cost exactly PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST, which is configured in the contract as 2e18 SantaToken. This constant communicates the expected economic rule of the system and should match the amount actually charged during execution.

  • The issue is that buyPresent() never enforces PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST. Instead, it calls SantaToken.burn(), and that function is hardcoded to burn only 1e18 tokens regardless of the configured price. As a result, the real execution path charges half of the documented cost.

uint256 public constant PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST = 2e18;
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
@> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
_mintAndIncrement();
}
function burn(address from) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
@> _burn(from, 1e18);
}

Because of this mismatch, a present can be bought with only 1e18 SantaToken even though the protocol configuration indicates the required cost should be 2e18.

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The mismatch occurs every time buyPresent() is called because the burn amount is hardcoded.

  • The issue does not depend on timing, permissions, or rare edge cases; it is part of the normal purchase flow.

Impact:

  • Presents are sold at half the configured price, breaking the intended token economics.

  • Integrators, reviewers, and users may rely on PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST and make incorrect assumptions about the actual purchase requirements.

Proof of Concept

Add to storage: address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");

function test_BuyPresentUsesOneTokenInsteadOfConfiguredTwoTokenCost() public {
uint256 configuredCost = santasList.PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST();
assertEq(configuredCost, 2e18);
// Give user only 1e18 even though configured cost is 2e18
deal(address(santaToken), user, 1e18);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 1e18);
uint256 attackerNftBalanceBefore = santasList.balanceOf(attacker);
// Purchase still succeeds with only 1e18
vm.prank(attacker);
santasList.buyPresent(user);
assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 0);
assertEq(santasList.balanceOf(attacker), attackerNftBalanceBefore + 1);
}

Recommended Mitigation

Ensure the purchase path enforces the same amount as the configured PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST.

- function burn(address from) external {
+ function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external {
if (msg.sender != i_santasList) {
revert SantaToken__NotSantasList();
}
- _burn(from, 1e18);
+ _burn(from, amount);
}
function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external {
- i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver);
+ i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST);
_mintAndIncrement();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 4 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] Cost to buy NFT via SantasList::buyPresent is 2e18 SantaToken but it burns only 1e18 amount of SantaToken

## Description - The cost to buy NFT as mentioned in the docs is 2e18 via the `SantasList::buyPresent` function but in the actual implementation of buyPresent function it calls the SantaToken::burn function which doesn't take any parameter for amount and burns a fixed 1e18 amount of SantaToken, thus burning only half of the actual amount that needs to be burnt, and hence user can buy present for their friends at cheaper rates. - Along with this the user is able to buy present for themselves but the docs mentions that present can be bought only for other users. ## Vulnerability Details The vulnerability lies in the code in the function `SantasList::buyPresent` at line 173 and in `SantaToken::burn` at line 28. The function `burn` burns a fixed amount of 1e18 SantaToken whenever `buyPresent` is called but the true value of SantaToken that was expected to be burnt to mint an NFT as present is 2e18. ```cpp function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { @> i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); _mintAndIncrement(); } ``` ```cpp function burn(address from) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } @> _burn(from, 1e18); } ``` ## PoC Add the test in the file: `test/unit/SantasListTest.t.sol`. Run the test: ```cpp forge test --mt test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount ``` ```cpp function test_UsersCanBuyPresentForLessThanActualAmount() public { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks user once as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); // Santa checks user second time santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // christmas time 🌳🎁 HO-HO-HO vm.warp(santasList.CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME()); // user collects their present vm.prank(user); santasList.collectPresent(); // balance after collecting present uint256 userInitBalance = santaToken.balanceOf(user); // now the user holds 1e18 SantaToken assertEq(userInitBalance, 1e18); vm.prank(user); santaToken.approve(address(santasList), 1e18); vm.prank(user); // user buy present // docs mention that user should only buy present for others, but they can buy present for themselves santasList.buyPresent(user); // only 1e18 SantaToken is burnt instead of the true price (2e18) assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), userInitBalance - 1e18); } ``` ## Impact - Protocol mentions that user should be able to buy NFT for 2e18 amount of SantaToken but users can buy NFT for their friends by burning only 1e18 tokens instead of 2e18, thus NFT can be bought at much cheaper rate which is half of the true amount that was expected to buy NFT. - User can buy a present for themselves but docs strictly mentions that present can be bought for someone else. ## Recommendations Include an argument inside the `SantaToken::burn` to specify the amount of token to burn and also update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function with updated parameter for `burn` function to pass correct amount of tokens to burn. - Update the `SantaToken::burn` function ```diff -function burn(address from) external { +function burn(address from, uint256 amount) external { if (msg.sender != i_santasList) { revert SantaToken__NotSantasList(); } - _burn(from, 1e18); + _burn(from, amount); } ``` - Update the `SantasList::buyPresent` function ```diff + error SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); function buyPresent(address presentReceiver) external { + if (msg.sender == presentReceiver) { + revert SantasList__ReceiverIsCaller(); + } - i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver); + i_santaToken.burn(presentReceiver, PURCHASED_PRESENT_COST); _mintAndIncrement(); } ```

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