Santa's List

AI First Flight #3
Beginner FriendlyFoundry
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`collectPresent` can be claimed multiple times by transferring NFT away

Description

The collectPresent function is intended to allow each address to collect a present only once. To enforce this, the contract checks whether the caller already owns an NFT by verifying that balanceOf(msg.sender) is greater than zero.

However, this check only looks at the current NFT balance, not whether the address has already claimed a present in the past. If a user collects a present, transfers the NFT to another address, and then calls collectPresent again, their balance becomes zero and the check is bypassed.

Because of this, the contract cannot reliably track whether an address has already collected a present, allowing repeated claims by the same address.

function collectPresent() external {
..............
@> if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
@> revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
@> }
.............
}

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • NFT transfers are normal behavior.

  • Any user who has already collected can transfer the NFT away and call collectPresent again.

Impact: High

  • Users can mint multiple NFTs using a single address.

  • EXTRA_NICE users can repeatedly receive SantaTokens.

  • This breaks the one-present-per-address assumption and leads to uncontrolled minting.

Proof of Concept

This test demonstrates that an address can collect a present, transfer the NFT to another address it controls, and then call collectPresent again. Since the contract only checks the caller’s current NFT balance, transferring the NFT resets the condition and allows repeated claims.

function test_CanCollectMultipleTimesByTransferringNFT() public {
address alice = makeAddr("alice");
address alice2 = makeAddr("alice2");
// Assume Alice is already marked as NICE or EXTRA_NICE
// Alice collects the present for the first time
vm.startPrank(alice);
santasList.collectPresent();
// Alice transfers the NFT to another address she controls
santasList.safeTransferFrom(alice, alice2, 0);
// Alice's balance is now zero, so the check is bypassed
// Alice can collect the present again
santasList.collectPresent();
vm.stopPrank();
}

Recommended Mitigation

Instead of checking the caller’s current NFT balance, explicitly track whether an address has already claimed a present and prevent repeat claims.

// State variables
+ mapping(address => bool) private s_hasClaimed;
function collectPresent() external {
if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) {
revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet();
}
- if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) {
- revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
- }
+ if (s_hasClaimed[msg.sender]) {
+ revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected();
+ }
if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE &&
s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
+ s_hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true;
return;
}
if (
s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE &&
s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE
) {
_mintAndIncrement();
i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender);
+ s_hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true;
return;
}
revert SantasList__NotNice();
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-04] Any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function multiple times.

## Description `collectPresent` function is callable by any address, but the call will succeed only if the user is registered as `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` in SantasList contract. In order to prevent users to collect presents multiple times, the following check is implemented: ``` if (balanceOf(msg.sender) > 0) { revert SantasList__AlreadyCollected(); } ``` Nevertheless, there is an issue with this check. Users could send their newly minted NFTs to another wallet, allowing them to pass that check as `balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` after transferring the NFT. ## Vulnerability Details Let's imagine a scenario where an `EXTRA_NICE` user wants to collect present when it is Christmas time. The user will call `collectPresent` function and will get 1 NFT and `1e18` SantaTokens. This user could now call `safetransferfrom` ERC-721 function in order to send the NFT to another wallet, while keeping SantaTokens on the same wallet (or send them as well, it doesn't matter). After that, it is possible to call `collectPresent` function again as ``balanceOf(msg.sender)` will be `0` again. ## Impact The impact of this vulnerability is HIGH as it allows any `NICE` user to mint as much NFTs as wanted, and it also allows any `EXTRA_NICE` user to mint as much NFTs and SantaTokens as desired. ## Proof of Concept The following tests shows that any `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` user is able to call `collectPresent` function again after transferring the newly minted NFT to another wallet. - In the case of `NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs, while transferring all of them in another wallet hold by the user. - In the case of `EXTRA_NICE` users, it will be possible to mint an infinity of NFTs and an infinity of SantaTokens. ``` function testExtraNiceCanCollectTwice() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); // User collect present again santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); // Users now owns 2e18 tokens, after calling 2 times collectPresent function successfully assertEq(santaToken.balanceOf(user), 2e18); } ``` ## Recommendations SantasList should implement in its storage a mapping to keep track of addresses which already collected present through `collectPresent` function. We could declare as a state variable : ``` mapping(address user => bool) private hasClaimed; ``` and then modify `collectPresent` function as follows: ``` function collectPresent() external { // use SantasList__AlreadyCollected custom error to save gas require(!hasClaimed[msg.sender], "user already collected present"); if (block.timestamp < CHRISTMAS_2023_BLOCK_TIME) { revert SantasList__NotChristmasYet(); } if (s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.NICE) { _mintAndIncrement(); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } else if ( s_theListCheckedOnce[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE && s_theListCheckedTwice[msg.sender] == Status.EXTRA_NICE ) { _mintAndIncrement(); i_santaToken.mint(msg.sender); hasClaimed[msg.sender] = true; return; } revert SantasList__NotNice(); } ``` We just added a check that `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` is `false` to execute the rest of the function, while removing the check on `balanceOf`. Once present is collected, either for `NICE` or `EXTRA_NICE` people, we update `hasClaimed[msg.sender]` to `true`. This will prevent user to call `collectPresent` function. If you run the previous test with this new implementation, it wail fail with the error `user already collected present`. Here is a new test that checks the new implementation works as desired: ``` function testCorrectCollectPresentImpl() external { vm.startPrank(santa); // Santa checks twice the user as EXTRA_NICE santasList.checkList(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); santasList.checkTwice(user, SantasList.Status.EXTRA_NICE); vm.stopPrank(); // It is Christmas time! vm.warp(1_703_480_381); vm.startPrank(user); // User collects 1 NFT + 1e18 SantaToken santasList.collectPresent(); // User sends the minted NFT to another wallet santasList.safeTransferFrom(user, makeAddr("secondWallet"), 0); vm.expectRevert("user already collected present"); santasList.collectPresent(); vm.stopPrank(); } ```

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